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INTRODUCTION I . 
Frequently civil rights are thought of much as they 
were defined during the late eighteenth century as includ¬ 
ing only those rights identified in the first eight amend¬ 
ments to the United States Constitution; principally, the 
freedom of speech, press, assembly and religious worship, 
and the fundamentals of a fair trial in a court of law. 
This view, however, overlooks one of the nation's basic 
civil rights—the right to vote. 
The focus of this study is upon the free exercise 
of that right by the Negro American in an isolated instance 
of voting behavior—the 1960 Presidential election in Fulton 
County, Georgia. 
Over the decades, much has been said about the im¬ 
portance of the Negro vote in politics or the Negro as a 
new force in politics—both southern and national. Like 
other Americans, however, Negro political participation has 
been at times apathetic, a seemingly strange phenomenon con¬ 
sidering the tremendous obstacles, including the poll tax, 
white primary and literacy tests, with which Negroes have 
1 
2 
had to deal in their long and arduous struggle for the free 
exercise of this Constitutionally guaranteed right. Never¬ 
theless, whenever they do cast their ballots—regardless of 
the proportion in which it is cast—their vote is the sub¬ 
ject of considerable attention. Inevitably, the question 
is asked, "Why did they vote that way?," and then the specu¬ 
lation begins as to the possible caus’es of their behavior. 
It is upon this "why" of the Negro vote in the 1960 
Presidential election that this study will place primary em¬ 
phasis . 
Preliminary observation of recent Negro political 
history reveals that the Negroes were in the Democratic camp 
in the 1948 Presidential election, but switched to that of 
the Republican in 1952, with the Democratic candidate re¬ 
ceiving but a small percentage of the Negro vote that year. 
They remained in the Republican Party, with increasing al¬ 
legiance, throughout the Eisenhower years, but made what can 
be interpreted as a break with that Party in 1960 by casting 
nearly 50 per cent of their vote for the Democratic candi¬ 
date and 50 per cent for the Republican. The Negroes move 
from the Republican Party gained increasing momentum, cli¬ 
maxing with the Negroes once again almost solidly entrenched 
in the folds of the Democratic Party. 
3 
It is the purpose of this study to examine the de¬ 
velopments in the background of Negro political participa¬ 
tion in the South in an attempt to arrive at a conclusion 
about the Negro vote in the 1960 Presidential election. 
Preliminary consideration has given rise to the be¬ 
lief that through the research the following assumption will 
be supported: 
That the history of Negro political participation lead¬ 
ing up to 1960 was as important a factor in deciding 
the Negro vote in that year's Presidential election as 
were the major candidates themselves. 
In order to substantiate this hypothesis, the study 
will undertake a brief analysis of the Negro's political 
history in the South with emphasis upon efforts—primarily 
attributed to the Democratic Party—at disfranchising the 
Negro. Some attention will also be given specifically to 
Negro political participation in Georgia which clearly had 
some effect upon political participation in Atlanta. 
In pursuit of this investigation the study will em¬ 
ploy the following methods: 
1. Search of existing literature. 
Those sources containing information deemed perti¬ 
nent to the study will be used to provide the necessary in¬ 
formation concerning the Negro's political history. 
4 
2. Compilation of statistical data. 
The official United States censuses of population 
over a twenty-year period, 1940-1960, will be used; the of¬ 
ficial records of the Fulton County Registrar of Voters Of¬ 
fice, and official records of the Secretary of State's Of¬ 
fice showing a county-by-county tabulation of election re¬ 
turns and other official publications of the Secretary's 
Office, including various helpful maps and the Georgia 
Election Code will be used in compiling the material relat¬ 
ed to the analysis of the selected elections. 
3. Examination of local newspapers. 
The Atlanta Constitution and the Atlanta Journal 
will be used to supply information concerning Negro politi¬ 
cal participation in the State as well as in Fulton County. 
The local Negro newspapers, the Atlanta Daily World and the 
Atlanta Inquirer will be examined in order to provide infor¬ 
mation concerning the degree of political influence they 
have on Negroes in the area. Also they will be examined to 
determine their stands on particular issues and candidates 
in the selected elections, and to see how Negro leaders 
spoke out in favor of a particular candidate as opposed to 
another. Concentration will be on those issues of all the 
newspapers which appeared subsequent to the white primary 
5 
decisions, both in Georgia and in Texas, and upon those 
issues that appeared during the weeks leading up to the se¬ 
lected elections for the period 1948-1960. 
4. Interviews with Negro leaders. 
These interviews will primarily take the form of in 
formal talks and will be used largely to supplement the 
printed material. The interviews will be restricted to 
some of the older leaders in the city who are particularly 
knowledgeable about the Negro's record of political partic¬ 
ipation, and the progress made by Negroes in overcoming ob¬ 
stacles to registration, in the State and in Fulton County 
proper. 
The study will necessarily be faced with certain 
limitations. It is felt, however, that they will not seri¬ 
ously hamper the findings of the study. One such limita¬ 
tion is to be encountered in examining the United States 
Census data. Interim population figures published in the 
annual census abstracts do not have an age breakdown. There 
fore, no true figures of the actual voting age population 
can be determined for other than the decennial census years 
The study will therefore be forced to rely upon estimates 
for interim years which are deemed close-enough approxima¬ 
tions of the actual figures. 
6 
One other limitation, which at first seemed tremen¬ 
dous, is the fact that there is no official agency or reg¬ 
ister in the State of Georgia or Fulton County that is re¬ 
sponsible for keeping the official precinct returns from 
the various selections. This obstacle, however, was over¬ 
come in that where these official returns would not be ob¬ 
tained through other sources, the returns published in the 
official county newspaper were used. Although unofficial, 
these returns do furnish an accurate estimate of the out¬ 
come of the election in each precinct. 
By a careful exploration of the above avenues of in¬ 
quiry and the prudent compilation of the data uncovered, it 
is believed that this study will accomplish its stated aim, 
an explanation of the Negro vote in the 1960 Presidential 
election. 
II. THE NEGRO AND THE BALLOT: 1870-1960 
The importance of the right to vote 
"An essential feature of our form of government is 
the right of the citizen to participate in the governmental 
process."'*' Through the careful exercise of this right a 
citizen may remedy some of his civic grievances. He may 
exercise this right primarily in support of a particular 
candidate, issue or party; or he may use the right to turn 
out of office an unsatisfactory candidate. The citizen may 
act alone, or he may combine his vote with those of other 
citizens to effect a certain change in public policy. In 
short, a citizen's right to vote gives him a choice in the 
selection of governmental officials and policies; it gives 
him a right to participate in the everyday affairs of his 
community. 
Conversely, a voteless people has no voice in the 
political life of its community. Consequently, for about 
^U.S., Commission on Civil Rights, Voting, 1961 Com¬ 
mission on Civil Rights Report, Book I (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 15. 
7 
8 
seventy-five years after being made a citizen, the Negro 
American in the South was without a voice in civic affairs. 
The legal right existed for much of this time, but because 
of the efforts of southern whites who wanted to "keep the 
Negro in his place," he was unable to exercise this right. 
Therefore, it was not unusual that in such places as 
Opelousas, Louisiana, "no Negro was allowed to come within 
the limits of the town without special permission of his em- 
2 
ployer," or to find many other communities wherein Negroes 
were to be off the streets by a specific hour. 
Racial discrimination at the polls has been one of 
the roots of all the Negro's social and civic ills in the 
South since the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment. It is 
a practice that has been widely condoned throughout the 
South. The national government has made numerous attempts 
to strike down this discrimination at the polls. The Su¬ 
preme Court has ruled it unconstitutional; Congress has out¬ 
lawed it. Yet, it has persisted in one form or another in 
3 
parts of the South. 
2 
John Hope Franklin, Reconstruction After the Civil 
War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 49. 
U.S., Commission on Civil Rights, loc. cit. 
9 
The national consequence of disfranchisement for any 
group of people is complete economic, political and social 
alienation. This has been in part, the plight of the Negro 
since 1870. A Negro witness at the Civil Rights Commission1 s 
hearings in Louisiana summed the case up classically when he 
said: 
So, you see, we have nobody to represent us, on the 
Jury, school board office, the State Legislature, no¬ 
where. All the laws are being passed we have no voice 
in, whether it is for us or against us, and I don't 
think you can find many that is for us.^ 
Legal and extralegal means of 
disfranchisement 
When the United States Constitution was adopted in 
1789, the individual citizen had no basic civil rights; 
these basic rights were not granted until 1791 in the form 
of the eight amendments to that document. Also, there was 
no provision in the original Constitution for a free and 
open franchise, perhaps largely because the Anglo-Saxon 
founding fathers could find no such provision in the mother 
country which they could have incorporated in the American 
document. In fact, during the first eighty years of the 
nation's constitutional history, the suffrage was viewed 
4 
Ibid., p. 16. 
10 
more or less as a privilege and was widely restricted to 
one class—the adult white males. Even then, the right to 
vote was largely subjected to rigid, artificial and often 
harsh restrictions, including such things as property and 
... 5 religious qualifications. 
In order to remedy this situation somewhat, and to 
guarantee a meaningful right to vote, particularly to 
Negroes, two amendments to the Constitution were passed in 
rapid succession—the Fourteenth in 1868 and the Fifteenth 
in 1870. The essence of these two of the three Civil War 
Amendments was to grant citizenship and the right to vote 
to the Negro. Yet, despite the fact that through these 
amendments, the Negro was given the constitutional rights 
of being a citizen and to vote, he still encountered mam¬ 
moth opposition, especially in the South, in the exercise 
of this right. White southerners resorted to numerous forms 
of terror and intimidation—notably Ku Klux Klan raids, ar¬ 
son, lynchings, and many other atrocities—in order to deny 
the Negro his constitutionally guaranteed right.^ 
5 
Charles Aikin, The Negro Votes (San Francisco: 
Chandler Publishing Co., 1962), p. 1. 
g 
Franklin, op. pit., pp. 153-157. 
11 
Subtle means of disfranchisement which at times 
bordered on the incredible were also employed. Such things 
as last-minute changes in polling places, complicated bal¬ 
lots, and literacy tests effected both the common whites 
7 . ... 
and the Negro. The height of atrocities directed against 
the Negro was perhaps realized in the "Mississippi Plan," 
which evolved in the 1870's. The overt purpose of this 
g 
plan was "overthrowing the Negro vote by brute force." 
Through such methods as riot, fraud, intimidation, and boy¬ 
cott, the Negro as a factor in Mississippi politics was ef¬ 
fectively neutralized. This plan also spread to other 
9 
states m the South. 
As if these heinous acts were not enough, the White 
Southerners also pursued more sophisticated legal means 
through direct state action indirectly aimed at Negro dis¬ 
franchisement .^ These efforts materialized either in the 
form of statutes or constitutional amendments. Legislators 
7Ibid., p. 219. 
g 
W.E.B. DuBois, Black Reconstruction (New York: Har¬ 
court Brace and Co., 1935), pp. 412, 447-450, passim. 
9 
V. 0. Key, Jr., Southern Politics (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, Inc., 1949), pp. 535-539. 
10 Ibid. 
12 
in Mississippi, South Carolina, and Louisiana led the way 
in contriving devious techniques designed to void the Con¬ 
stitutional guarantee to the Negro by constitutional means. 
The limitations imposed by these states even seem drastic 
when compared with those imposed by the other southern 
states that imitated them. Mississippi, for example, at its 
constitutional convention of 1890, adopted an elaborate 
electoral scheme bent on circumventing the National Consti¬ 
tution. It contained provisions for lengthy residence re¬ 
quirements, a poll tax, literacy or "understanding" tests, 
and advanced registration.^ 
Five years later, at its constitutional convention, 
South Carolina promulgated a document whose suffrage pro¬ 
visions were similar to those of Mississippi. The principal 
difference in the two sets of provisions was the establish¬ 
ment in South Carolina of additional alternatives to liter¬ 
acy which might enable whites to vote. Under these pro¬ 
visions, a South Carolina resident unable to fulfill the 
literacy requirements might still qualify to vote through 
the payment of a property tax. This tax had to be paid 
during the previous year and the property on which it was 
11 Ibid., p. 537. 
13 
12 
paid must have had an assessed value of $300 or more. 
Louisiana in 1898 put its new constitution into ef¬ 
fect incorporating the novel "grandfather clause" designed 
to allow poor and illiterate whites to qualify to vote, 
. . 13 
while effectively disfranchising the Negro. 
Together the Mississippi, South Carolina, and 
Louisiana constitutions contained the basic provisions which 
were to be copied in some form or other by the other south¬ 
ern states. It was the now famous grandfather clause as in¬ 
corporated into the Oklahoma constitution in 1910 that pro¬ 
vided the basis for the first major Constitutional test in 
the twentieth century of a "legal" mode of disfranchisement. 
The Oklahoma grandfather clause required that a per¬ 
son be able to read and write any section of the state con¬ 
stitution in order to qualify as a voter. However, those 
persons or descendents of such persons who were entitled to 
vote under any form of government prior to January 1, 1866, 
were exempted from the test. Since Negroes were not allowed 
to vote in that state and many others prior to 1866, the re¬ 
quired literacy test was used to disfranchise the majority 




14 In 1915, the constitutionality of the Oklahoma 
amendment was challenged. The Supreme Court in a unanimous 
decision ruled that the provision was designed to circum¬ 
vent the Fifteenth Amendment by setting the date of voting 
eligibility for illiterates prior to the Fifteenth Amend¬ 
ment. Since Negroes had not been enfranchised before that 
date, the Court ruled that the amendment was designed to 
prevent them from voting on the basis of their race, and 
15 
thus was held to be contrary to the Fifteenth Amendment. 
This decision effectively knocked out a temporary provision 
that had been incorporated in many of the southern states 1 
constitutions. 
Aside from the constitutional means of Negro dis¬ 
franchisement, an extralegal phenomenon known as the "white 
primary" originated in the South about the same time as the 
Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) . 
1S 
In 1916, Oklahoma enacted a new law designed to 
disfranchise Negroes. Although this one omitted the ances¬ 
tral exemptions that were struck down in the Guinn case, it, 
nevertheless, provided that persons eligible to vote in 
1914, a time when the grandfather clause was still in effect, 
were permanently qualified to vote. All others were requir¬ 
ed to register during a twelve-day period or otherwise be 
permanently disfranchised. The law was struck down by the 
Supreme Court in Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939). 
15 
direct primary and became a more effective method of dis¬ 
franchisement than any of the constitutional or statutory 
ones. By interpreting its action as being that of a private 
association and not a part of state action, the Democratic 
Party was legally able to circumvent the constitution and 
practice discrimination along wholly racial lines. Ulti¬ 
mately the direct primary method of nomination came to be 
regulated by formal party statutes rather than simply by 
party rule, thus making for a formal limitation of primary 
participation. 
Eventually this phenomenon was to spread over the 
entire South. Consequently, largely because of the one- 
party nature of the South, Negroes, with but few exceptions,^ 
were without a voice up until the time of the Supreme Court's 
monumental decision in 1944. 
The Supreme Court and Negro suffrage 
Smith v. Allwriqht, the landmark case of 1944, 
^After reconstruction ended in the South, Negroes 
adhered, almost to a man, to the Republican Party, and the 
Democratic Party remained lilly-white. As the direct pri¬ 
mary became more popular as a method of nomination, the 
white primary rule was simply a continuation of already 
existent practices. "Negroes were all Republicans anyway." 
Key, op. cit., p. 620. 
16 
climaxed a seventy-five year struggle on the part of Negroes 
17 
in the South to vote. The history of that struggle which 
began in 1870 has been traced in part up to this point. 
The Texas legislature, in the early 1920's, obvi¬ 
ously inspired by the Supreme Court's ruling in the case of 
18 
Newberry v. United States, provided the impetus that set 
in motion a series of attacks on what was perhaps the most 
serious obstacle to Negro suffrage in the South—the notori¬ 
ous white primary. The Court, in its 1920 ruling, had ap¬ 
parently given sanction to the white primary notion. Inter¬ 
preting the case in light of Article I, section 4, of the 
19 
Constitution, the Court ruled that the Congressional power 
to regulate the manner of holding elections does not include 
the regulation of primaries. Mr. Justice McReynolds, de¬ 
livering the majority opinion in the case, said that the 
Court could not conclude "that authority to control party 
17 , 
Sidney A. Jones, Jr., The White Primary and the 
Supreme Court. Reprinted from the National Bar Journal, III 
(March, 1945). 
1 Q 
256 U.S. 232 (1920) . 
19 ... 
Article I, sec. 4, of the Constitution states m 
part: "The Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections 
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in 
each state by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may 
at any time by law make or alter such Regulations. . . ." 
17 
primaries or conventions for designating candidates was be¬ 
stowed on Congress by the grant of power to regulate the 
manner of holding elections." Such an exercise of author- 
20 
ity would "infringe upon liberties reserved to the people." 
The Texas white primary law, passed in 1923, and in 
part induced by a disappointed candidate who had lost the 
Negro vote and consequently the nomination in a San Antonio 
primary in which Negroes had participated, forbade Negroes 
"to participate in a Democratic primary election held in the 
21 
State of Texas." Prior to that time, exclusion of Negroes 
from the Democratic primaries had been accomplished outside 
the framework of state action, thus keeping within the legal 
limits of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Now, 
Texas for the first time had taken direct state action in 
the form of a legislative act denying Negroes the right to 
participate in its primaries, and consequently leaving it¬ 
self open to challenge. 
The first of these attacks came in 1927 from an El 
Paso, Texas, Negro doctor, L. A. Nixon, who alleged that 
20 Newberry v. United States. 
21 V. 0. Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups 
(4th ed.; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1958), p. 653. 
18 
election officials had denied his request to vote. The 
Court, in what seems to have been a unanimous opinion, did 
not consider the act in question in terms of the Fifteenth 
Amendment, but voided it in light of the equal protection 
of the laws provision of the Fourteenth. Mr. Justice 
Holmes, delivering the opinion of the Court, found it "hard 
to imagine a more direct and obvious infringment of the 
22 
Fourteenth. 
Five years later, Dr. Nixon was before the Court 
23 again after having been once more denied the right to vote. 
Subsequent to his first case, the Texas legislature had 
passed a new statute charging the executive committee of 
each party with the authority to determine who could vote 
in its primaries. Acting under this statute, the Democra¬ 
tic Party once again barred Negroes from its primary. The 
statute was brought into question because it was thought to 
be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court, in 
a majority opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Cardoza, inter¬ 
preted the action of the executive committee in this case 
as being state action and therefore ruled the Texas statute 
2 2 ^Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). 
23 
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932). 
19 
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The most startling of the white primary cases was 
24 decided by the Court in 1935. This time the Democratic 
Party, acting at its state convention, had tried to preserve 
its white primary by denying membership in the party to 
Negroes, which in turn denied them the right to vote be¬ 
cause they were not members of the party. The Court upheld 
this action, ruling unanimously that it was definitely party 
action and not state action as in the other two cases. Thus 
with this case it appeared as though Texas and the remainder 
of the South had finally hit upon the one thing that would 
effectively disfranchise Negroes without violating the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 
This immunity, however, was not very long-lived, in 
that finally in 1944 the long-awaited climax to the Negro's 
struggle for the vote was reached in the Supreme Court1s de- 
25 
cision in Smith v. Allwright. In what was termed a 
"smashing victory" for the National Association for the Ad- 
9 /■ 
vancement of Colored People, the Court took a complete 
24 
Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935) . 
25321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
2 6 
"The Supreme Court Rules Out White Primaries, " 
Crisis (May, 1944), 164. 
20 
reversal from its earlier stand in Grovey v. Townsend and 
declared that the action of the Texas Democratic convention 
in restricting its membership to whites, thereby excluding 
Negroes from the electoral process, was "state action with- 
27 
in the meaning of the Fifteenth Amendment. ..." 
The Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Allwright 
effectively marked the end of the extralegal white primary 
as a method of complete disfranchisement of the Negro in the 
South. From that time on, efforts to deny Negroes the op¬ 
portunity to exercise their constitutionally guaranteed 
right generally took milder forms such as a poll tax or 
literacy test. 
The Smith v. Allwright decision also represented a 
significant legal triumph for the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People whose lawyers had long 
been active in the struggle to end racial discrimination at 
the polls. Having won their first major suffrage victory 
in the Guinn case in 1915, the N.A.A.C.P. lawyers repeated 
this feat in 1927 and again in 1932. They met with defeat, 
however, in the Grovey case arising out of Houston, Texas, 
in 1935, but gained added impetus from the results of the 
2^Smith v. Allwright. 
21 
28 
Classic case of 1941, and went on that same year to file 
in the federal court at Houston, the Smith case, challeng¬ 
ing the white primary. An interesting sidelight of the case 
is that it projected into the limelight one of the most able 
defenders of Negro rights in the twentieth century— 
Mr. Thurgood Marshall, assistant to Judge William H. Hastie 
. 29 
in arguing the case before the Supreme Court. 
The Negro and the ballot in Georgia 
The invalidation of the white primary combined with 
the stimulus generated by the war created a general resur¬ 
gence of political activity among Negroes in the South. 
After the end of Reconstruction and the disintegration of 
the Republican Party in the South, and after having been 
alienated for ao long by the Democratic Party in the South, 
Negroes for the most part appeared to be ready to step into 
their new roles a full-fledged citizens and exercise their 
^United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). In 
this Louisiana case election officials charged with fraud 
in a direct primary nomination of a U.S. Representative, 
argued that direct primaries were not subject to federal 
regulation. The Court, in a 5-3 decision, ruled that a pri¬ 
mary election in this sense (that is, where the Primary is 
an integral part of chosing one's representatives, or where 
it actually controls that choice) would fall under the mean¬ 
ing of elections in Article I, secs . 2 and 4, of the Constitution. 
29 
Crisis, loc. cit. 
22 
constitutionally guaranteed right to vote. What appears to 
have been typical of this feeling of readiness on the part 
of Negroes, particularly Georgians, was expressed in a 
statement before the press by a prominent Atlanta Negro, 
Mr. C. A. Scott, editor of the Atlanta Daily World, and 
chairman of the Public Affairs Committee of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People: "the 
Supreme Court decision is clear and cleancut ... I expect 
to case one /a. votein the primary July 4." 
Casting a vote in the July 4, 1944, primary was to 
prove to Negroes not to be as easy a task as Mr. Scott1s 
statement may have implied. The State Executive Committee 
had met before the July primary and decided that the deci¬ 
sion in the Smith case only applied to the state of Texas. 
The Georgia primary was left intact for the simple reason 
31 
that "Georgia officials were not parties to the case." 
Already under way at that time was a plan designed 
to test the Georgia white primary. Muscogee County party 
officials and Negro leaders had met and arranged for a 
token vote to be attempted by a selected group of Negroes 
30 
Atlanta Journal, April 4, 1944. 
^Ibid., June 7, 1944. 
23 
32 
in Columbus, Georgia. Shortly afterwards, Negro leaders 
33 in Atlanta decided to try a similar plan. 
It was the Columbus plan, however, out of which the 
eventual Court case was to grow. The plantiff in the case, 
the Rev. Primus E. King, along with other Negroes in the 
Columbus test group, had been denied the right to vote in 
the July, 1944, primary. Supported by collections from 
various Negro churches, Rev. King filed suit against the 
Democratic Party. His case was heard by Federal Judge T. 
Hoyt Davis, himself a Georgia Democrat. The ruling in the 
case was handed down in October, 1945, with Judge Davis 
saying in part that the primary is: 
. . . an integral part of the electoral process of this 
state. . . . It is the hub of the process. When the 
Democratic Party holds a primary in this state the sys¬ 
tem is substantially the same ... as the Texas and 
Louisiana systems. 4 
It was obvious from the decision that the white pri¬ 
mary in Georgia had finally come to its end. Nevertheless, 
35 die-hard party leaders appealed the decision. The 
22Ibid., May 31, 1944. 
22Ibid., June 7, 1944. 
24King v. Chapman, 62 F. Supp. 639 (1945) . 
35 It is at this stage that the N.A.A.C.P. interven¬ 
ed in the case and offered to help Rev. King. 
24 
decision, however, was upheld and later the Supreme Court 
refused to review the case. 
Although the King decision opened the door to full 
participation in the proceedings of the Democratic Party, 
the Negro faced still another obstacle, namely, the undemo¬ 
cratic county unit system, which had become an integral part 
of the Georgia primary. This system, peculiar to Georgia, 
was begun during the colonial period and had been definite¬ 
ly established by 1843.37 
The county unit system, also referred to as "the 
38 
3-2-1 plan, 11 was based on the representation of the lower 
house of the State Legislature. According to the plan, each 
county was given twice as many unit votes as it had repre¬ 
sentatives in the General Assembly. Table 1 below illus¬ 
trates the distribution of unit votes by counties during 
the last days of the county unit system. The necessary ma¬ 
jority for election at this time was 206 unit votes. It is 
obvious from the table that the rural areas dominated the 
^8Chapman v. King, 154 F (ad) 460 (1946) . 
37 .... L. M. Holland, The Direct Primary in Georgia 
(Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1949), p. 44. 
38Ibid., p. 45. 
25 
remainder of the state. 
TABLE 1 
DISTRIBUTION OF COUNTY UNIT VOTES 
IN GEORGIA3 
Size of No. of No. of Rep's Unit Vote 
Co's Co 1 s Each Each Total 
Largest 8 3 6 48 
Intermediate 30 2 4 120 
Smallest 121 1 2 242 
Total 159 410 
au.s. Census Report, Holland, loc . cit. 
This system of voting was employed in making nomina¬ 
tions to most of the major state offices, including governor, 
supreme court justices, and even United States Senators and 
Representatives. In order to be nominated, a candidate had 
only to receive a plurality of the unit votes, or in the 
case of nominations for governor or senator, a majority. To 
secure the unit votes of a particular county a mere plural¬ 
ity of the popular votes cast was necessary. In many in¬ 
stances it was not necessary for a candidate to have receiv¬ 
ed a majority of the total popular vote in order to secure 
the nomination. The gubernatorial election of 1932 out of 
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which Eugene Talmadge emerged the victor illustrates this 
phenomenon. In that contest, Talmadge received a majority 
of fifty-nine unit votes, although he was some 22,000 popu- 
39 lar votes short of a majority. 
The overall effect of this distribution of unit 
votes was that the voting power of the more populous coun¬ 
ties of the state was considerably less than that of the 
smaller counties. More specifically, the county unit sys¬ 
tem neutralized the effect of the Negro vote. The 121 
smallest counties in the state controlled a majority of the 
unit votes, thus enabling them to determine the outcome of 
any election. Negroes were largely located in these rural 
black belt areas of the state, where political interest 
among Negroes was generally low; and in the urban centers, 
which were practically voiceless in state affairs. 
Negro registration 
According to the United States Statistical Abstract 
of 1947, the total population of the state of Georgia was 
3,123,723. Of this number, 2,038,278 were white and 
1,084,927 were Negro. The total population of the United 
39 E. Merton Coulter, Georgia, A Short History (Chapel 
Hill; The University of North Carolina Press, 1947), 
pp. 437-438. 
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States itself was 131,080,388, with a racial breakdown be¬ 
tween white and Negro of 118,214,870 to 12,865,518. By the 
time of the 1944 white primary decision, the maximum poten¬ 
tial voting strength of the Negro was estimated to be about 
seven and one-quarter million out of a 91,600,000 nation- 
. . 40 
wide total of voting age citizens. The actual voting 
strength of the Negro in the South was understandably slight 
at this time, having been estimated to be about 250,000. By 
the end of 1948, the actual Negro voting population in the 
South had only reached 750,000, a significant increase over 
the 1940 figure, yet still not too impressive when compared 
with the more than seven million Negroes eligible but not 
registered to vote.^ 
Early estimates of the prospective strength of the 
southern Negro vote by the time of the 1948 presidential 
election proved to be highly optimistic when they placed 
the strength of the Negro vote at one million. The actual 
Negro registration figures at that time fell somewhat short 
of this projected figure in that the eleven states of the 
40 
Henry Lee Moon, Balance of Power; The Negro Vote 
(New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1949), pp. 9-10. 
41 These figures are based on thirteen southern 
states. 
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Deep or Solid South recorded only 595,000 registered 
Negroes. It was not until the 1952 presidential election 
that Negro registration in the Deep South surpassed the one 
million mark. During that span of years the Negro voting 
population was increased by better than 413,000 voters. No 
such similar increase was made in the Negro voting popula¬ 
tion until the six-year period between 1960 and 1966 when 
the registration figures increased by more than one million. 
Table 2 illustrates this growth in Negro voter registration 
during the thirteen-year period from 1947 to 1960; a com¬ 
parison of Tables 2 and 3 will show the increase in voter 
registration during the six-year period following the period 
of this study. 
During the period between the invalidation of the 
white primary and the 1960 presidential election, the South 
as usual continued to lag behind the rest of the country in 
the overall percentage of eligible citizens who voted. For 
example, during the 1956 presidential campaign only slight¬ 
ly more than 26 per cent of the eligible Negroes in the 
South were registered; whereas, about 60 per cent of the 
white voting age population was registered, although in 
42 many cases the white voter rolls were padded. 
42Margaret Price, The Negro and the Ballot in the 
South (Atlanta: Southern Regional Council, 1959), pp. 9-11. 
These figures are based on eleven southern states. 
TABLE 2 
NEGRO REGISTRATION: 1947-1960a 
State 1947 1952 1956 1958 1960 
Alabama 6, 000 25,224 23,366 70,000 73,272 
Arkansas 47,000 61,413 69,677 64,023 72,604 
Florida 49,000 120,900 148,703 144,810 163,128 
Georgia 125,000 144,835 163,389 161,958 180,000 
Louisiana 10,000 120,000 161,410 131,068 156,938 
Mississippi 5,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 22,000 
North Carolina 75,000 100,000 135,000 150,000 172,166 
South Carolina 50,000 80,000 99,890 57,978 58,122 
Tennessee 80,000 85,000 90,000 185,000 185,000 
Texas 100,000 181,916 214,000 226,818 226,818 
Virginia 48,000 69,326 82,603 92,172 100,100 
Totals 595,000 1,008,614 1,238,038 1,303,827 1,410,148 
aFigures obtained from the Southern Regional Council. 
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Generally throughout the entire period Negro regis¬ 
tration made gradual increases. The greatest increase, how¬ 
ever, came at the close of the period when between 1960 and 
1966, Negro voter registration increased from 28.2 per cent 
to more than 50 per cent. Table 3 illustrates this growth 
in Negro registration. 
Despite the fact that 26 per cent of the Negro 
voting age population was registered in the South as a whole 
as far back as 1956 (before the Voting Rights Bill and fed¬ 
eral intervention), caution needs to be exercised in the in¬ 
terpretation of these percentages in that many areas of the 
South were far from this proportion. Discrimination against 
Negroes had traditionally been practiced in these areas and 
this discrimination was more acute in those black belt areas 
where the ratio of Negroes to whites was highest.^ 
Nevertheless, the Negro has made considerable strides 
since the passage of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments 
to the Constitution in what was an uphill fight all the way. 
for the free exercise of his constitutional right. Despite 
the obstacles, he was persistent in this struggle—"intent 
upon attaining full equality of citizenship in his native 
43 Key, ojo. cit., p. 666. 
TABLE 3 
NEGRO VOTER REGISTRATION FOR SELECTIVE YEARS 
AND VOTING AGE POPULATION 



















% VA P 
Reg. 
Total 250,000 4.9 1,008,614 21.3 1,238,038 26.2 1,410,148 28.2 2,503,140 50.1 
H 
Census 1940 Census 1950 Census 1960 
Negro VAP Negro VAP Negro VAP 
7,025,000 4,729,956 5,000,376 
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44 land." And, today--with the importance of his vote being 
generally conceded, and much being said about the Negro as 
a new force in politics, both southern and national—the 
Negro seems to be slowly waking up to the fact that the bal¬ 
lot is his most effective instrument in his continuing 
struggle for equality. 
44 :Moon, op. cit., p. 7. 
III. EARLY ELECTIONS: PRELUDE TO 1960 
The Presidential election of 1948 
When Franklin D. Roosevelt died in April, 1945, 
Vice-President Harry S. Truman succeeded him as the thirty- 
second President of the United States.^ 
Roosevelt, author and initiator of the "New Deal," 
had quite an impressive record when compared with that of 
his successor. He had attended college at Harvard, and 
Columbia's Law School. He had served in the New York Legis¬ 
lature and in President Woodrow Wilson's cabinet before be¬ 
coming the Governor of New York State for two terms. More¬ 
over, Roosevelt, as President, became the only man in his¬ 
tory to be elected to the presidency for more than two 
terms. Through his New Deal policies he had also become the 
hero of the working classes and the underprivileged. 
Truman, on the other hand, was a man of common back¬ 
ground with no more than a high school education. He had 
served in the armed forces and risen to the rank of Major. 
Upon his discharge from service he opened a haberdashery 
■*-Rexford G. Tugwell, How They Became President (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1964), pp. 403-427 passim. 
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business in Kansas City, Missouri, which failed two years 
later. Truman then ran and was elected to a minor public 
office in Missouri. In 1934, he was elected to the United 
States Senate, where he remained until 1944, when he was 
nominated and elected Vice-President with Franklin Roosevelt 
Within a few months after Roosevelt's death and 
Truman's succession to office, World War II was to come to 
an end and the United States would then begin its return to 
the ways of peace. Those old domestic quarrels, which are 
inevitably suppressed during critical times would be renewed 
Like Lincoln, death had spared Roosevelt these hardships. 
Nevertheless, as his successor, Truman would neces¬ 
sarily inherit all the resentment of the administration that 
had been building up throughout the course of the war. More¬ 
over, the Republicans emerged victorious from the mid-term 
elections of 1946, having their most successful campaign in 
more than twenty years. The Truman Administration was thus 
faced with the added problem of a Republican majority in 
both houses of Congress and in the executive departments of 
the several states. 
Fortunately for Truman, however, he had nearly four 
years in order to smooth out some of the existing difficul¬ 
ties before facing the electorate. Throughout this period 
35 
his popularity was to fluctuate greatly. At the nadir in 
1946, the Marshall Plan, governmental control of prices, 
and his attitude toward the Soviet Union, brought the Presi 
2 
dent's popularity up to a new level the following year. 
By the Spring of 1948, Mr. Truman's popularity was 
once again at an all-time low. In October, 1947, the Presi 
dent's Civil Rights Commission had recommended a far-reach¬ 
ing program for the protection of minorities. Mr. Truman's 
advocacy of this program alienated the southern wing of the 
party. Even before Mr. Truman could call upon Congress to 
implement the Commission's proposals, Mississippi Governor 
Fielding L. Wright, in his January, 1948, inaugural address 
denounced the program and called for an open break with the 
3 
Democratic Party. 
Moreover, because Mr. Truman's popularity was at 
such a low ebb, party leaders began to look around for 
another possible nominee to head the Democratic ticket in 
1948. As the November elections drew nearer, a coalition 
consisting of States' Righters, big city bosses, and party 
liberals began to push for the nomination of General Dwight 
2Ibid. 
3 
Key, Southern Politics, p. 331. 
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D. Eisenhower, whose party identification nor political 
4 
philosophy were known at that time. 
After Eisenhower's refusal to accept the Democratic 
nomination, there was a brief but futile attempt to draft 
5 
Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas. Following the 
refusal of both these men, Truman's nomination for the Presi 
dency seemed certain, and the lackluster Democrats assem¬ 
bled in July at Philadelphia's Convention Hall to affirm 
their obvious choice. 
By the end of July, 1948, the stage had already been 
set for a four-way Presidential race in the upcoming Novem¬ 
ber election. The Democrats had chosen Truman and Berkley 
on the first ballot; it had taken the Republicans three bal¬ 
lots to reach a decision at Philadelphia on Dewey and Warren 
Rebellious Southerners, outraged by the National Democratic 
civil rights plank, had met in Birmingham, Alabama, and nom¬ 
inated Thurmond of South Carolina and Wright of Mississippi, 
while the Progressives had nominated Wallace and Taylor.^ 
A 
New York Times, June 6, 1948. 
^Ibid. 
^Congressional Quarterly Service, Politics in 
America; 1945-1964 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarter¬ 
ly Service, 1965), p. 6. 
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With four candidates in the race, Mr. Truman's elec¬ 
tion seemed an impossibility. Some of the events of his 
administration had been marked by several petty scandals 
which had irritated the public. Moreover, there was the 
Republican opposition in the able and aggressive character 
of Mr. Dewey with which to contend. Also, there was an ad¬ 
ditional threat posed by the split within his own party. 
Wallace threatened to draw the liberal votes from the Presi¬ 
dent, and the right wing States' Righters threatened to cap¬ 
ture the traditionally Democratic South. It is no surprise 
then that, with Truman confronted with seemingly mammoth 
odds, professional pollsters predicted his defeat in Novem¬ 
ber.7 
The total vote cast in the 1948 Presidential elec- 
O 
tion was 48,690,956. Mr. Truman, the victor, captured 
49.5 per cent of that vote, and the runner-up, Mr. Dewey, 
captured 45.1 per cent. The remainder of the vote was split 
between minor party candidates, the bulk of which went to 
7 
Tugwell, OJD. cit., p. 436. 
Q 
America Votes, ed. Richard M. Scammon (6 vols.; 
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958), II, pp. 5-6. Unless 
otherwise noted, figures on the 1948 Presidential election 
are from this volume. 
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the States' Righters and Progressives. 
The final electoral count in the election showed 
Truman having more than the necessary majority with 303 
Q 
votes, carrying a total of twenty-eight states, and Dewey 
with 189 electoral votes from sixteen states. The remaining 
states and electoral votes went into the column of the 
States' Rights Party. Table 4 illustrates this breakdown 
of the popular and electoral votes in the 1948 election. 
It is interesting to note here that a shift of 
roughly twelve thousand votes in two key states, California 
and Ohio, would have denied the election to Truman without 
giving it to Dewey.^ Since, in such a case, neither candi¬ 
date would have had a clear majority, the election would 
have been thrown into the House of Representatives, wherein, 
the 39 electoral votes captured by Thurmond would have de¬ 
cided the election. 
^Truman did not get all the electoral votes from the 
State of Tennessee. An elector in that State cast a vote 
for the States' Rights candidates, Thurmond and Wright. 
10The possibility of such a shift in the votes was 
not farfetched, in that Truman carried these two states, and 
also Illinois—which would have cinched the election for 
Dewey—by less than one per cent of the popular vote. The 
fifty electoral votes from these two states would have then 
been given to Dewey instead of Truman. Truman would have 
still led in electoral votes, however (253-239), but he 
would not have had the necessary majority of 267. 
TABLE 4 
NATIONWIDE VOTE IN 1948 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 





Harry S. Truman and 
Alben Barkley Democratic 24,104,030 49.51 303 
Thomas E. Dewey and 
Earl Warren Republican 21,971,004 45.13 189 
J. Strom Thurmond and 
Fielding L. Wright States' Rights 1,169,032 2.40 39 
Henry A. Wallace and 
Glen H. Taylor Progressive 1,157,063 2.38 
Norman Thomas and 
Tucker P. Smith Socialist 139,523 .29 
Claude A. Watson and 
Dale H. Learn Prohibition 103,343 . 20 
Edwart A. Teichert and 
Stephen Emery Socialist-Labor 29,240 .06 
Farrell Dobbs and 
Grace Carlson Socialist-Workers 13,611 
Totals 48,690,956 100.00 531 
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The outcome of the 1948 election in Georgia was 
quite different from what had been expected at the Birming¬ 
ham Convention. Instead of the names of Thurmond and Wright 
replacing the regular Democratic ticket on the ballot, their 
names were placed on the ballot as a third party ticket. 
Judging from the outcome of the election in those four 
states in which the States' Rights ticket did replace the 
regular Democratic ticket,^ this move in Georgia, as well 
as the other Southern States that followed suit, was detri¬ 
mental to the conservative States' Righters. The regular 
Democrats, in spite of the broad civil rights plank in their 
platform, carried the State, capturing more than 60 per cent 
of the popular vote. 
A county-by-county breakdown of the election results 
reveals that the regular Democrats polled a majority in all 
12 but twenty-five of Georgia's 159 counties. Of these 
twenty-five counties not in the Democratic column, the 
States' Rights Party commanded a majority in ten. The 
-'-•'-Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South 
Carolina. 
12 The Political Almanac, 1952, comp. George Gallup 
(New York: B. C. Forbes and Sons Publishing Co., Inc., 
1952), pp. 128-134. County figures for this election are 
taken from this volume. 
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Republicans only managed to carry two of these counties, 
while in the remaining thirteen counties, no party obtained 
a majority. The regular Democrats did, however, receive a 
plurality in ten of the thirteen counties. 
The combined totals of the States' Rights and regu¬ 
lar Democratic candidates illustrates the extent to which 
Georgians voted against the Republican Party in this elec¬ 
tion. Nearly half of Georgia's 159 counties registered com¬ 
bined totals of more than 90 per cent. Chattahochee, with 
99.1 per cent polled the highest. Out of twenty-seven of 
the counties registering combined totals of less than 80 per 
cent, only two, Dawson and Fannin, fell into the Republican 
column. 
Election results from Fulton County revealed that 
it was not high on the list of support for the Democratic 
Party. The county only gave the Democrats a 58 per cent 
majority of its vote, while the Republicans received a sub¬ 
stantial 29.8 per cent. The States' Rights Party, which 
ran a poor third in the county, received the remaining 12 
per cent of the vote. Fulton, likewise, was low in its com¬ 
bined total of States' Rights and Democratic support, pol¬ 
ling only 70.2 per cent of its vote for the two parties, 
thus making it third among the ten counties ranked lowest 
42 
in combined support for the two parties. 
The overall result of the 1948 election was certain¬ 
ly surprising. For months preceeding the election, poll¬ 
sters had been predicting the more or less certain defeat of 
Mr. Truman. Despite this, however, Mr. Truman moved out in 
front early on election eve and remained there until Mr. 
13 Dewey conceded the following morning. 
The voter turnout on that election day was light. 
The contest somehow seems to have not engendered the enthu¬ 
siasm that might ordinarily be expected in a Presidential 
race. Truman supporters stayed away from the polls because 
they thought their support was useless; Dewey supporters 
did likewise because they thought theirs to be unnecessary.^^ 
Nevertheless, Mr. Truman emerged from the contest victori¬ 
ous, and in so doing he became "one of the few successors 
by death who go on to becoming winning candidates on their 
.,15 own. 
Largely because the Negro had been so long barred 
13 Atlanta Journal, November 3, 1948. 
14 Morris L. Ernst and David Loth, The People Know 
Best (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1949), 
pp. 9-10. 
15 Tugwell, OJD. cit., p. 437 . 
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from the democratic processes in the South, the impact of 
his vote coming into the 1948 Presidential election was not 
considered to be of great consequence. What was acknowl¬ 
edged, however, was the strength of the Negro vote outside 
the South, and the fact that in any close national election 
Negroes controlled enough votes in fifteen states outside 
the South to swing a total of 277 electoral votes to the 
party of their choice. 
Thus, Mr. Truman was faced with the added dilemma of 
having to pacify both northern Negroes and southern whites 
regarding his party's civil rights plan. If he pushed too 
hard for the plan, Mr. Truman stood the chance of further 
alienating the South—that traditional area upon which De¬ 
mocratic candidates rely for support—and driving it deeper 
into the folds of the States' Rights Party, while, on the 
other hand, if he did not fight hard enough, he faced the 
risk of losing the support of Northern Negroes. Added to 
this was the concentrated appeal of the Progressives for the 
16 
Negro vote. 
In spite of this appeal, however, final election re¬ 
turns from the major Northern centers of Negro population 
"The Negro Prefers Truman, " The New Republic, CXIX 
(November 22, 1948), 8. 
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revealed that Negroes hacked Mr. Truman as strongly as they 
had his predecessor, Franklin Roosevelt. 
More than 75 per cent of the Negroes voting in 1948 
cast their ballots for President Truman. Returns from 
Chicago and Philadelphia, ranked second and third, respec¬ 
tively, according to the size of their Negro populations, 
show that Negroes in Chicago's second ward gave Mr. Truman 
his greatest win-margin in the city, and nine out of every 
ten of Philadelphia's Negroes cast ballots for the Presi¬ 
dent. Pittsburgh, ranked considerably lower, showed a sim¬ 
ilar trend when an all-Negro district of that city gave 
Mr. Truman a better than three-to-one margin of victory 
over runner-up, Mr. Dewey. 
A west coast daily newspaper revealed a similar pat¬ 
tern among Negro voters in California when it reported that 
"Negroes piled up heavy pluralities for Harry Truman, shun- 
18 ned Henry Wallace, and all but ignored Thomas E. Dewey." 
The Presidential election of 1952 
As President Truman's first full term in office drew 
17Ibid. 
18 
Ibid. Statement quoted from the West Coast Daily 
Worker. 
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to an end the usual speculation began as to whether he would 
accept another nomination by the Democratic Party. The 
President, however, quickly ended this speculation when he 
indicated that "after seven years at the White House ..." 
his preference was that he "should not run again. 
At this time it was also understood that Mr. Chief 
Justice Fred M. Vinson, Mr. Truman's first choice as his 
successor, had declined to enter the race. With the formal 
entry into the race of the Tennessee Senator, Estes 
Kefauver, Mr. Truman began to be pressured by party leaders 
to designate a candidate or take some kind of positive ac¬ 
tion that would prevent Kefauver from gaining delegate sup- 
20 port in the upcoming preferential primaries. It is with 
this thought in mind that Mr. Truman turned to Governor 
Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois. 
Governor Stevenson, however, despite Mr. Truman's 
pledge of support, consistently expressed his disinterest 
in the campaign, and it was only through a draft movement 
at the 1952 Democratic Convention that Stevenson ultimately 
became the Democratic standard bearer. 
I Q 
New York Times, January 24, 1952. 
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In the meantime, the Republicans were also busy try¬ 
ing to find a suitable nominee. In early January, 1952, 
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., of Massachusetts announced 
his intention to enter General Dwight D. Eisenhower's name 
21 
in the March 11, New Hampshire Primary. Prior to this 
time, neither General Eisenhower's party affiliation nor 
political philosophy had been known. This is evidenced by 
the futile attempt to get Eisenhower to accept the 1948 
Democratic nomination. Nevertheless, Senator Lodge main¬ 
tained that the General was a Republican. 
Shortly after Senator Lodge's announcement, General 
Eisenhower announced from his North Atlantic Treaty Organi¬ 
zation headquarters in Paris that he would accept a call by 
22 the Republican Party. 
In the pre-convention contests, General Eisenhower, 
despite his refusal to campaign, made quite an impressive 
showing, defeating Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio in the New 
Hampshire primary, running a strong second to "favorite son" 
candidate Harold Stassen in Minnesota, and going on to vic¬ 
tory in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Oregon. The most 
^Ibid., January 7, 1952. 
22 
Ibid., January 8, 1952. 
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effective candidate in the Democratic pre-convention con¬ 
tests was Senator Kefauver, suffering but one defeat, at 
the hands of Georgia Senator Richard B. Russell in the 
Florida primary. 
In July, 1952, both major parties assembled at 
Chicago's International Amphitheatre for their respective 
conventions. The Republicans convened first. To make 
their final decision on General Eisenhower, the Republicans 
needed but one round of balloting. General Eisenhower chose 
for a running mate Senator Richard M. Nixon of California. 
The Democrats, on the other hand, went through three rounds 
of balloting before finally deciding upon Governor Steven¬ 
son. His running mate was Senator John J. Sparkman of 
Alabama. 
Careful so as not to make the same mistake that they 
did in 1948, professional pollsters and commentators gen¬ 
erally did not venture to predict the outcome of the 1952 
2 3 election. Even so, when the election eve returns were 
tallied, it was clear that General Eisenhower had won a 
landslide victory. 
The total popular vote cast in the 1952 election was 
23 The Political Almanac, 1952, op. cit., p. 3. 
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61,550,918. Eisenhower won the election by a 6,621,242- 
vote plurality. In winning that election he polled 
33,936,234 votes—the highest number of popular votes ever 
cast for a Presidential candidate. Stevenson likewise set 
a record in losing that election. With 27,314,992 votes, 
hepolled the highest number of votes ever received by a de¬ 
feated Presidential candidate. 
The electoral count for 1952 furnishes a much more 
illustrative view of the extent of Eisenhower's landslide 
victory. In this instance the electoral vote was split be¬ 
tween the two major contenders for the presidency. No third 
party candidate received a share of the electors' vote. 
Eisenhower received 442 electoral votes to Stevenson's 89. 
Percentage-wise, the breakdown was 84 per cent for Eisenhower 
and 16 per cent for Stevenson. 
A state-by-state analysis of the vote reveals that 
only nine of the forty-eight states were carried by the De¬ 
mocrats; the remaining thirty-nine fell into the Republican 
column. Of the nine states carried by the Democrats, two— 
West Virginia and Kentucky—were in the border areas and the 
remainder were in the deep South—Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, 
24 
America Votes, op. pit., pp. 3-4. 
TABLE 5 
NATIONWIDE VOTE IN 1952 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 





Adlai E. Stevenson and 
John J. Sparkman Democratic 27,314,992 44.38 89 
Dwight D. Eisenhower and 
Richard M. Nixon Republican 33,937,252 55.14 442 
Vincent Hallinan and 
Charlotta Bass Progressive 140,178 . 23 
Stuart Hamblen and 
Enoch A. Holtwick Prohibition 77,778 .12 
Eric Haas and 
Stephen Emery Socialist-Labor 30,376 .05 
Darlington Hoopes and 
Samuel H. Friedman Socialist 20,189 .03 
Douglas MacArthur and 
Vivian Kellems Constitution 17,205 .03 
Farrel Dobbs and 
Myra Tanner Weiss Socialist-Workers 10,306 .02 
Henry Kragewski and 
Frank Jenkins Poor Man 1s 4, 203 .01 
Totals 61,550,918 100.00 531 
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Louisiana, Mississippi, North and South Carolina. It is be¬ 
lieved that these states voted for the Truman-Sparkman tick¬ 
et largely because of the South's long standing tradition of 
voting Democratic. This position is taken because these 
seven deep South states are among those that gave the 
States' Rights ticket its greatest support in 1948. 
Ironically, the Democrats failed to carry both 
Illinois and Missouri, the home states of Mr. Stevenson and 
Mr. Truman, respectively. The irony lies in the fact that 
it was the Illinois delegation at the National Convention 
that had worked so hard to draft Mr. Stevenson for the nom¬ 
ination; and it was Mr. Truman who had personally selected 
the Illinois Governor and had said that he would "take off 
25 
my coat and go out to help him win." Obviously Mr. Truman 
took his own home state for granted in that instance. 
An interesting sidelight to the Presidential race 
can be found in the Massachusetts' Senate race. There the 
35-year old Democratic Representative John F. Kennedy, 
handily defeated the incumbent, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., one 
of the top leaders in the Eisenhower drive for the 
25 
New York Times, July 26, 1952. 
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Republican nomination. 
Out of the nine border and deep South states that 
supported the Democrats in 1952, Georgia, where there was 
virtually no campaigning by the Democratic presidential 
nominee, gave Mr. Stevenson his largest win-margin. Ranked 
in order of the amount of support given to either candidate, 
Georgia was third, surpassed only by Vermont and North 
Dakota, both casting more than 70 per cent of their totals 
for Mr. Eisenhower. Election returns reveal that Georgians 
voted for Mr. Truman by a slightly better than two-to-one 
margin. This pattern followed closely the prediction of 
then-Governor Herman Talmadge, "a 'reluctant' voter for 
27 
Governor Stevenson." 
In the 1952 election, Georgia counties once again 
voted strongly Democratic. Unofficial returns reveal that 
the Republicans had slim leads in only three of Georgia's 
28 
159 counties. With two out of the thirteen precincts 
“^Congressional Quarterly Service, oja. cit., p. 19. 
27 
Atlanta Journal, November 5, 1952. 
2 8 
The writer regrets the fact that unofficial re¬ 
turns had to be relied upon in this instance, but no offi¬ 
cial returns for this election could be located at the 
several places consulted. It is felt, however, that these 
returns do give an adequate indication as to the outcome of 
the 1952 election. 
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reporting in a fourth county, the Republican candidate was 
but six votes behind, a deficit to be easily overcome con¬ 
sidering the past tendencies of this county to vote Republi¬ 
can . 
Returns from Fulton County showed Stevenson to be 
leading Eisenhower by quite an impressive margin. With bet¬ 
ter than two-thirds of the county's precincts reporting, the 
Democratic candidate's win-margin was better than 14,000 
4- 29 votes. 
Atlanta's Negro voter population was composed of 
slightly more than 22,000 voters, or about 25.8 per cent of 
30 the total electorate that exceeded 85,000. In the six 
predominantly Negro precincts alone, more than 10,000 votes 
were cast in the 1952 election. Five of Atlanta's six Negro 
precincts cast substantial majorities for the Democratic 
31 candidates (see Table 6). 
The months leading up to the Presidential election 
of 1952 had been marked by considerable speculation as to 
2 9 Atlanta Journal, November 5, 1952. 
30 
Jack Walker, "Negro Voting in Atlanta: 1953-1961, " 
Phylon, XXIV (Winter, 1963), 380. 
31 Source of Table 6: Atlanta Journal, November 5, 
1952; unofficial election returns. 
TABLE 6 





Votes Cast for 
Stevenson 
Number Per Cent 
Votes Cast for 
Eisenhower 
Number Per Cent 
Total 
Per Cent 
1-C 1,412 1,098 77.76 314 22 .24 100.00 
3-A 363 300 82.61 63 17.39 100.00 
3-B 1,965 1,337 68.04 628 31.96 100.00 
3-E 1,166 87 3 74.88 293 25.12 100.00 
3-H 776 700 90.20 76 9.80 100.00 
7-A 4,805 1,568 32.63 3,237 67.37 100.00 
Totals 10,487 5,876 56.22 4,611 43.78 100.00 
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the course of the Negro vote in that election. Although 
little attention was given to the southern Negro's vote, 
the general consensus leading up to the election was that 
the Negroes, despite the presence of Alabama Senator John 
Sparkman on the ticket, would vote Democratic because of 
the stronger civil rights plank in the Democratic platform. 
The fact that Sparkman was a southerner was brushed aside by 
pointing to the fact that Negroes since 1932 had supported 
three other southerners—Garner, Truman, and Barkley—for 
Vice-President; and with the exception of Garner, they had 
32 
proved satisfactory. The Negro press had also leaned to¬ 
ward the Democratic candidates in the months preceeding the 
33 election. 
The Presidential election of 1956 
The 1956 Presidential campaign produced a cast of 
familiar faces. Contestants for the Democratic nomination 
were basically the same. The unsuccessful 1952 nominee, 
Adlai E. Stevenson, was first to announce his candidacy. 
The preferential primary choice of 1952, Estes Kefauver, 
o 2 
Armistead Scott Pride, "The Negro Vote: Ike or 
Adlai?," Nation, CLXXV (August 16, 1952), 126. 
33 
Ibid., p. 124. 
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was second to enter the race; and finally, New York Governor 
Averell Harriman, entered the race early in January, 1956. 
Another Presidential hopeful of little consequence was 
Senate majority leader, Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas, who re¬ 
ceived backing from several southern leaders, but little 
support outside the South. 
In late February, 1956, President Eisenhower an¬ 
nounced his intention to seek a second term. California 
Senator William F. Knowland had earlier announced that he 
would seek the Republican nomination if Mr. Eisenhower were 
not to do so. With the President's announcement, however, 
he withdrew his candidacy, and from that time on there was 
no announced opposition to Mr. Eisenhower's re-nomination. 
He then went on to make impressive showings in all the pre¬ 
convention primaries he entered. 
When the conventions assembled in August, selecting 
the presidential nominees was more or less matters of for¬ 
mality. Stevenson was approved by the Democrats, meeting at 
Chicago, on the first ballot with Harriman, former President 
Truman's choice, running a very poor second in the ballot¬ 
ing. Eisenhower was chosen by acclamation one week later 
at the Republican's Convention at San Francisco's Cow Palace. 
The most significant event at the 1956 Democratic 
56 
Convention was the selection of the Vice-Presidential candi¬ 
date. Stevenson, in a departure from tradition, did not 
designate his running mate; instead, he left the choice up 
to the Convention. Consequently, a stiff contest followed, 
with Estes Kefauver barely winning the nomination over 
Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy on the second ballot 
The significance of this contest for the vice-presi¬ 
dential nomination is that it marked the formal entry of 
Senator Kennedy into presidential politics. Kennedy's good 
showing convinced many of his backers that he could win 
despite being a Roman Catholic. 
At their respective conventions, both parties in¬ 
corporated somewhat modified civil rights planks into their 
platforms. The Republicans, taking a more definite stand 
on the issue than the Democrats, supported the enactment of 
the civil rights program presented earlier to the 84th 
Congress by President Eisenhower, and concurred in "the con¬ 
clusion of the Supreme Court that its decision directing 
school desegregation should be accomplished with 'all de- 
. ^ s liberate speed' locally through federal district courts." 
34Congressional Quarterly Service, 0£. cit., pp. 23-24. 
35 Kirk H. Porter and Bruce Johnson, National Party 
Platforms, 1840-1956 (Urbana: The University of Illinois 
Press, 1956), p. 554. 
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The Democrats, on the other hand, taking a somewhat weaker 
stand, merely acknowledged Supreme Court rulings as "part of 
the law of the land," hut rejected proposals to use force 
in implementing the Court's decisions. 
As the 1956 election returns were finally counted, 
it was clearly evident that President Eisenhower had retain¬ 
ed his office. Out of a slightly higher total vote than in 
1952, Mr. Eisenhower won an even greater landslide victory 
than he had upon first being elected to office. 
The total popular vote cast in 1956 was 62,053,908 
Mr. Eisenhower, with 35.6 million votes, captured the larg¬ 
est popular vote total in history. He carried forty-one 
states with a total of 457 electoral votes. Mr. Stevenson, 
with slightly more than 26 million votes, ran somewhat be¬ 
hind his 1952 total. The final vote showed that he had 
captured a majority in only seven states, two less than his 
earlier total. Aside from Missouri, which was won from the 
Republicans, all of the states carried by Mr. Stevenson were 
in the deep South and all had voted Democratic four years 
previously. Once again Georgia gave Stevenson his greatest 
36Ibid., p. 542. 
37 America Votes, op. cit., pp. 1-2. 
TABLE 7 
NATIONWIDE VOTE IN 1956 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 





Adlai E. Stevenson and 
Estes Kefauver Democratic 26,035,504 41.9 7 73 
Dwight D. Eisenhower and 
Richard M. Nixon Republican 35,589,477 47.37 45 7 
T. Coleman Andrews and 
Thomas H. Werdel Constitution 176,887 .29 
Harry F. Byrd and 
William E. Jenner States 
1 Rights 134,132 .21 
Eric Hass and 
George Cozzini Socialist-Labor 44,443 .07 
Enoch A. Holtwick and 
Edwin M. Cooper Prohibition 41,937 .07 
Farrell Dobbs and 
Myra T. Weiss Socialist-Workers 7,795 .01 
Darlington Hoopes and 
Samuel H. Friedman Socialist 2,121 .00 
Henry Krajewski and 
Anne Marie Yezo 
American Third 
Party 1,829 .00 
Geralk L. K. Smith and 
Charles F. Robertson 
Christian 
Nationalist 8 .00 
Totals 62,026,908 99.99 530 
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win-margin in the nation, although falling off a few per¬ 
centage points from the 1952 total. Mr. Stevenson's elec¬ 
toral vote total was seventy-three. Although the total 
electoral votes in the seven states he carried amounted to 
seventy-four, one elector in Alabama cast his vote for 
Alabama Circuit Judge Walter B. Jones and Georgia Governor 
38 
Herman Talmadge. 
So strong was the Republican sentiment in 1956 that 
Mr. Eisenhower was able to carry the Deep South state of 
Louisiana by an 85,000-vote plurality. Not since 1876, when 
Rutherford B. Hayes eked out a one-vote electoral victory 
over the Democrat, Samuel J. Tilden, had Louisiana voted 
Republican. This feat in 1956 is attributed largely to the 
39 increased Republican vote among Negroes. 
In keeping with the nation-wide trend, the total 
vote cast by Georgians was slightly higher in 1956 than it 
was in 1952. In the 1956 election, all but eleven of 
Georgia's 159 counties voted solidly Democratic. In the 
eleven counties that were exceptions, only three were carried 
38 
Charles A. H. Thomson and Frances M. Shattuck, The 
1956 Presidential Campaign (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1960), p. 345. 
~^Ibid., p. 353. 
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by the Republicans by substantial majorities. In the re¬ 
maining eight counties that voted Republican, shifts of but 
fourteen or fewer votes would have put three of them into 
the Democratic column. 
Election results from Fulton County reveal that the 
Democrats had an 11,000-vote majority, for 56 per cent of 
the County1s vote as compared to 44 per cent for the Repub¬ 
licans. Precinct returns from the city of Atlanta proper 
show that the Democratic win-margin was slightly less. The 
Democrats barely managed to eke out a 4,316-vote plurality 
in that race. 
It can also be seen from these returns that Negroes 
in Atlanta took a more or less complete turn away from the 
Democrats in this election. They supported President 
Eisenhower by better than 80 per cent in all but three of 
the eleven predominantly Negro precincts in the city, two 
of which, 1—C and 6-1, had a white voter population of 31 
40 
and 42 per cent, respectively, in 1956 (see Table 8). 
These figures pose quite a contrast to the results 
of the 1952 Presidential election wherein Negroes in five of 
40 
Official Returns from 1956 General election. Cour¬ 
tesy of Mr. Neill Leach, Member of the Democratic Executive 
Committee (State). 
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Atlanta's six predominantly Negro precincts voted heavily 
for Stevenson. The highest percentage of Negro votes cast 
for Eisenhower in that election was 32 per cent, quite a 
contrast to his lowest percentage of 61 in 1956. 
It is interesting to note here that the Negro vote 
in the 1956 Presidential election could conceivably have 
carried the city of Atlanta for Eisenhower. As mentioned 
earlier, Stevenson's win-margin in Atlanta was but a slim 
4,316 votes. Consequently, a shift of a mere 2,158 votes 
would have given Atlanta to Eisenhower. The votes cast for 
Stevenson in the predominantly Negro precincts alone were 
enough to effect such a change. Had such a shift in the 
Negro vote taken place, Eisenhower would have had a 758-vote 
plurality in Atlanta. 
Moreover, some 3,616 Negroes in the eleven predomi¬ 
nantly Negro precincts failed to show up at the polls on 
that election day. Had these voters turned out, and had 
they voted for Eisenhower, his possible win-margin in Atlanta 
would have surpassed Stevenson's actual win-margin. 
It is felt that Negroes supported the Republicans to 
such a great extent in this election largely because of the 
failure of the Democrats to take a more positive stand on 
the civil rights issue. Stevenson's policy of "gradualism," 
TABLE 8 





Votes Cast for 
Stevenson 
Number Per Cent 
Votes Cast for 
Eisenhower 






1,183 465 39.30 718 60.69 99.99 
3-A 340 61 17.94 279 82.05 99.99 
3-B 1,783 232 13.01 1,551 86.98 99.99 
3-E 1,671 363 21.72 1,308 78.27 99.99 
3-H 1,436 204 14.21 1,232 85.79 100.00 
3-K 816 98 12.00 718 87.99 99.99 
4-1 1,263 202 15.99 1,061 84.00 99.99 
6-H 1,436 210 14.63 1,226 85.37 100.00 
6-1 1,189 379 31.88 810 68.12 100.00 
7-A 1,162 162 13.94 1,000 86.05 99.99 
7-D 1,447 161 11.13 1,286 88.87 100.00 
Totals 13,726 2,537 19.21 11,189 80.78 99.99 
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with the year 1963 earmarked as a possible target date for 
complete integration of the schools, irritated many 
41 Negroes. Such a policy did not seem amicable to Negroes 
at a time when Autherine Lucy was being escorted, "in a 
42 most ungradual way," from the campus of the University of 
Alabama, and the Till case in Mississippi, and the Montgomery 
bus boycott loomed large in the minds of Negroes. 
One significant outcome of the Eisenhower victory in 
1956 is that it marked the first time since pre-New Deal 
43 days that Negroes en masse had voted Republican. Thus, 
for the first time since 1932, Eisenhower had successfully 
penetrated the coalition that had been established between 
Negroes and the Democratic Party. 
41 
Robert Bendiner, "The Negro Vote and the Demo¬ 
crats, " The Reporter, XIV (May 31, 1956), 10. 
42Ibid. 
^Ibid., p. 8. 
IV. THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1960 
The 1960 Presidential campaign was officially 
launched by the Democrats, when Minnesota Senator Hubert H. 
Humphrey announced his intention to enter at least four of 
the upcoming preferential primaries.'*" Humphrey's announce¬ 
ment was followed immediately by Massachusetts 1 Senator John 
2 
F. Kennedy on January 2, 1960. Kennedy, too, planned to 
enter the spring primaries, beginning with the one in New 
Hampshire. 
Two other contenders for the Democratic nomination 
were Senators Stuart Symington of Missouri, and Lyndon B. 
Johnson of Texas. Both men announced their candidacies 
late so as to avoid the spring primaries. Symington, who 
had the backing of former President Harry Truman, announced 
3 
his candidacy in late March, while Senate majority leader 
Johnson, who had received support for the Presidential 
~*~New York Times, December 31, 1959. 
2 
Ibid., January 3, 1960 
^Ibid., March 25, 1960. 
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nomination from Southern party leaders at the 1956 Conven¬ 
tion, announced his candidacy at the Los Angeles Sports 
, 4 Arena. 
A "dark horse" candidate in contention for the nom¬ 
ination was the two-time presidential nominee Adlai E. 
Stevenson. Because Stevenson had suffered two previous de¬ 
feats, he, like Symington, Johnson, and Humphrey in the 
early months of the campaign, was counting on a convention 
deadlock that would propel him into the nomination once 
5 
again. 
This field of announced Democratic hopefuls in 1960 
represented a departure from the established tendency in the 
Democratic party of selecting state governors as presiden¬ 
tial nominees. Instead, all four of the chief contenders 
for the nomination by the Democrats in 1960 were senators. 
Moreover, they were all relatively young senators, none 
having completed two full Senate terms. Johnson and 
Humphrey were first elected to the Senate in 1949, while 
Kennedy and Symington were elected in 1953. Senator 
Symington, at 59, represented the eldest of the four chief 
4Ibid., July 6, 1960. 
5Ibid., March 25, 1960. 
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contenders, and Senator Kennedy, at 43, was the youngest. 
The Republicans in 1960 were also confronted with 
the task of selecting a new presidential nominee. The in¬ 
cumbent President, Mr. Eisenhower, was not eligible to seek 
a third term because of the constitutional limitations im¬ 
posed by the Twenty-second Amendment. Consequently, the 
role of Republican standard-bearer fell to Vice-President 
Richard M. Nixon, who had been established as Eisenhower's 
heir-apparent before the 1956 presidential campaign.6 
Vice-President Nixon's nomination had become some¬ 
what a matter of certainty long before the Republicans as¬ 
sembled at Chicago's International Amphitheatre. The only 
potential threats that had arisen to his nomination came 
from New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller and Arizona Sena¬ 
tor Barry Goldwater. Both men had been brought to the at¬ 
tention of party leaders by virtue of the impressive vic¬ 
tories they had won two years earlier in contests for their 
respective offices. They represented both extremes of the 
party—Rockefeller, the liberal, and Goldwater, the conserva¬ 
tive . 
^Paul T. David, "The Presidential Nominations," The 
Presidential Election and Transition, 1960-1961, ed. by 
Paul T. David (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 
1961), pp. 1-2. 
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The threats posed to Nixon's candidacy by both 
Rockefeller and Goldwater were mild ones. After failing to 
get the desired support for the 1960 Presidential nomina¬ 
tion, Rockefeller announced on December 26, 1959, that he 
had made a "definite and final" decision not to seek his 
party's presidential nomination because he wished to avert 
a "massive" fight at the convention. He also announced an 
"absolutely definite" resolve not to be the party's candi- 
7 
date for Vice-President." 
Goldwater's candidacy likewise represented no major 
threat to Nixon. His support was concentrated in a few con¬ 
servative areas of the country, mainly in the South and 
g 
Southwest, and instead of challenging Nixon for the nomi¬ 
nation, Goldwater emphasized support of his candidacy. 
From the very beginning the Kennedy forces knew 
that their man would have very little chance of getting the 
nomination if the convention should deadlock. Therefore 
they had no alternative but to try for an all-out victory 
9 
on the first or second ballot. With remarkable precision 
7 
New York Times, December 27, 1959. 
g 
David, 0£. cit., p. 4. 
9 
Austin Ranney, "The 1960 Democratic Convention: 
Los Angeles and Before," Inside Politics: The National Con¬ 
ventions, 1960, ed. by Paul Tillett (New York: Oceana Pub¬ 
lications, Inc., 1962), p. 8. 
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the group of amateur strategists that Kennedy had assembled 
set out to achieve this goal. 
When the Democratic convention opened in Los Angeles 
on July 11, 1960, the chance of the nomination going to 
Senator Kennedy seemed almost a certainty. Of the 761 con¬ 
vention votes required for the nomination, Kennedy was as¬ 
sured of more than 700 votes as the convention opened its 
first session. His nearest competition for the nomination 
was Senator Johnson, whose actual total of votes at roughly 
300 fell far short of his pre-convention estimate of 502%. 
On July 13, 1960, the Democratic National Conven¬ 
tion held its first ballot. When the balloting was com¬ 
pleted, the final vote tally showed that Kennedy had 806 
votes and the nomination. His nearest competitor, Johnson, 
had 409 votes. Symington had 86 votes, Stevenson 79^, and 
the remaining 140^ votes were scattered.'*''*' 
Following his successful nomination, Senator Kennedy 
began to confer with party leaders about the selection of a 
Vice Presidential candidate. Prime consideration was given 
■^Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 
1960 (New York: The New American Library, 1961), pp. 186, 
158. 
11 
Ibid., p. 195. 
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to Lyndon Johnson, who ran second in the convention ballot¬ 
ing, but had once remarked that he would "never, never, 
never trade his senatorial vote for the Vice Presidential 
12 
gavel." Nevertheless, an early-morning telephone call 
from Kennedy to Johnson on July 14, apparently confirmed the 
decision. 
Labor leaders in the party looked with disdain upon 
Johnson's selection; however, in their opinion his presence 
on the ticket would possibly alienate the northern Negro 
vote which could be critical in any close election. Even 
so, it later became evident that Johnson's presence on the 
ticket had proved to be the essential element in holding 
13 most of the traditionally Democratic South to the party. 
In general, the Republican events leading up to, and 
to some extent including, the National Convention were keyed 
to a much lower tempo then those found in the Democratic 
party. As if to exemplify this low key of events, Vice- 
President Nixon did not even trouble himself to deliver a 
formal statement of his intent to seek the nomination. This 
duty was assigned to an aide, who, on January 9, 1960, 
-*-^Ibid., pp. 199-200. 
13Ibid., pp. 198-204. 
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announced that the Vice-President was a candidate, and that 
his name would be entered in several of the Presidential 
14 
primaries. 
Nixon faced virtually no opposition in the precon¬ 
vention primaries he entered. Consequently, delegates were 
usually pledged to his support, and by late May, 1960, 
Nixon, according to Associated Press figures, had more than 
the necessary majority of the 1331 delegates pledged to his 
15 
cause. 
The Republican Convention which convened at Chicago 
in late July was just as pro-Nixon as had been events lead¬ 
ing up to the convention. When, on Wednesday evening, July 
27, Richard M. Nixon's name was placed in nomination for the 
presidency, he received 1321 of the convention's delegate 
votes. The remaining were cast by the Louisiana delegation 
for Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater. The Arizona delegation 
then moved to give the nomination to Nixon by acclamation.^ 
The following day, Mr. Nixon's choice of Vice Presi¬ 
dential candidate, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., was confirmed by 
•*-^T)avid, op. pit., pp. 3-4. 
~*~^Ibid., p. 4. 
16 
New York Times, July 28, 1960. 
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. 17 the convention. 
Aside from the two major parties' candidates, the 
1960 Presidential campaign found the usual array of minor 
party candidates in contention for the nation's highest of¬ 
fice. Perennial candidates Farrell Dobbs and Eric Hass, 
representing the Socialist Workers and Socialist Labor 
parties, respectively, were once again in the race. Senator 
Harry F. Byrd who had been in two of the four Presidential 
campaigns since 1944, was once again pledged to the southern 
cause in 1960. Arkansas Governor Orval E. Faubus, recently 
re-elected to a two-year term, was also in the race, repre- 
18 senting the National States' Right's Party. 
The remaining minor party candidates were largely 
newcomers to the presidential campaign. As is the case 
with virtually every presidential campaign, the multiplicity 
of these parties and the different party labels under which 
candidates appeared in the various states makes it rather 
difficult to pinpoint them all. Moreover, it is difficult 
17Ibid., July 29, 1960. 
18 Svend Petersen, A Statistical History of the Ameri¬ 
can Presidential Elections (New York: Frederick Ungar Pub¬ 
lishing Co., 1963), pp. 7-10. Richard M. Scammon, American 
Votes (Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962), 
IV, p. 2. 
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to consider the minor parties very seriously in that often 
they give the appearance of being slates which are hurriedly 
thrown together, and the candidates obviously have no inten¬ 
tion of winning. This belief is in part substantiated by 
the fact that one particular minor party candidate in the 
1960 campaign appeared as the vice-presidential nominee for 
19 
two different parties. Nevertheless, Table 9 (below) con¬ 
tains the names of all those of the vote in 1960. 
Campaign issues 
Not since 1928 had either of the major parties nom¬ 
inated a Roman Catholic for the presidency. In that year, 
the Democrats nominated Alfred E. Smith of New York to head 
their national ticket. Smith was subsequently dealt a re¬ 
sounding defeat at the polls by Herbert C. Hoover. His 
Catholicism, although not the only issue involved, figured 
. 20 heavily in that defeat. 
By the time of the 1960 presidential campaign, the 
percentage of Roman Catholics in the nation's total popula¬ 
tion had greatly increased; and the general consensus of the 
19 Scammon, Ibid. 
20 Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, p.204. 
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population seemed to be one of the greater religious toler- 
ence. Nevertheless, the question of Kennedy's Catholicism 
was still of great consequence throughout the campaign. One 
of the main arguments put forth against his candidacy was 
that a Catholic president would be subject to the wishes of 
the Church. In effect, the United States would be governed 
by the Pope in Rome. 
Kennedy could not evade nor suppress this issue in 
his campaign. He had been confronted with it once—in the 
21 May 10 West Virginia primary. Catholics in West Virginia 
comprise only about 5 per cent of the total population? the 
remainder is made up mostly of fundamentalist Protestants, 
descendants of those pioneers who crossed the mountains with 
Bibles in one hand and rifles in the other. Consequently, 
pre-primary polls had shown Kennedy's religion to be a 
detriment to him. Despite this, however, Kennedy was suc¬ 
cessful in West Virginia, polling some 60 per cent of the 
2 2 total vote and carrying 48 of the state's 55 counties. 
21 For a running account of the events in the West 
Virginia primary, see White, op. pit., pp. 118-134. Except 
where otherwise noted, the following discussion is taken 
from those pages in White's book. 
22 Ranney, op. pit., p. 10. 
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Kennedy's upset victory in West Virginia had two 
significant results: first, it forced Minnesota Senator 
Humphrey—whom Kennedy had defeated in the primary of his 
neighboring state of Wisconsin—to formally withdraw from 
the campaign; and secondly, it proved for the first time to 
many party leaders that this particular Catholic candidate 
23 could win a lot of votes. 
Even with Kennedy's surprising victory in West 
Virginia, the question of his religion still hung in the 
air. Ultimately Kennedy had to face this issue head-on, or 
be doomed to defeat; and on September 12, 1960, at Houston, 
Texas, he appeared by invitation before the Greater Houston 
Ministerial Association to discuss his religion. 
In the Ballroom of Houston's Rice Hotel, Kennedy de¬ 
livered a short speech, saying in part: 
. . . I believe in an America where the separation of 
Church and State is absolute—where no Catholic prelate 
would tell the President (should he be a Catholic) how 
to act. . .where no church or church school is granted 
any public funds or political preference—and where no 
man is denied public office merely because his religion 




'White, op. cit., p. 296. 
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That is the kind of America in which I believe. And. . 
. . . . . 9 R 
.the kind of Presidency m which I believe. . . 
When Kennedy had finished answering questions re¬ 
garding his remarks, he had also successfully clarified his 
views of the role of the present-day Catholic in a plural¬ 
ist society. He had also won considerable applause and per¬ 
sonal sympathy from an audience which was almost hostile at 
the outset. Even so, the effect of this showing in the 
November election could not yet be measured. D 
Aside from the Roman Catholic issue in the cam¬ 
paign, the nation's domestic and external affairs were also 
in somewhat of a turmoil, and would weigh heavily in the 
outcome of the upcoming election. Considering the events 
which had transpired since the spring of 1960, pre-conven¬ 
tion polls had indicated that foreign policy might be the 
major concern of the voters. Since May, the Soviets had 
shot down an American reconnaisance plane and imprisoned 
the first acknowledged spy ever seized in the Soviet Union, 
the Paris Summit Conference had collapsed, President 
^Taken from text of Senator Kennedy's remarks on 
church and state. Delivered September 12, 1960, to the 
Greater Houston Ministerial Association, Houston, Texas. 
Reprinted in White, op. pit., pp. 437-439. 
26 
White, Ibid., p. 298. 
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Eisenhower had to cancel a proposed visit to Japan because 
of widespread anti-American riots, and the newly indepen¬ 
dent Congo and the Castro regime in nearby Cuba presented 
problems with which a new administration would have to 
27 deal.‘ 
On the domestic scene, too, there were trouble 
spots. The economy had been described by the Federal Re¬ 
serve Bank of New York as being at a high level; employment 
was at a peak, but so was unemployment; steel production 
fell off during the summer, and farm income was still low. 
Moreover, as if to add to the already existing worries of 
the candidates, both presidential aspirants, as well as the 
Democratic vice presidential nominee, had to return to 
Washington for a three-week post-convention session of 
Congress, instead of being able to go out and immediately 
29 begin their campaigns. 
One of the most important issues in the 1960 Presi¬ 
dential campaign—one which affects so great a portion of 
28 
27Stanley Kelly, Jr., "The Presidential Campaign," 
The Presidential Election and Transition, 1960-1961, ed. by 
Paul T. David (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 
1961), p. 59. 
O Q 
Ibid., p. 60. 
29 White, op. cit., pp. 284-285. 
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the nation's population that it must inevitably occupy a 
prominent position in virtually all national elections—was 
that of civil rights. In its 1960 platform, the Democrats, 
despite the presence of Johnson on the ticket, seemed de¬ 
cidedly in favor of Negro rights. In their 1960 platform 
30 "The Rights of Man" as it was called, the Democrats sup¬ 
ported demonstrations by Southern Negroes at segregated 
lunch counters and promised federal intervention in the 
Negro's quest for full equality in job opportunities. More¬ 
over, the Democratic vice presidential candidate, as Senate 
majority leader had succeeded through his peculiar methods 
of influencing Senators in bringing about the open discus¬ 
sion of civil rights between Northern and Southern Congress¬ 
men; and he managed to secure the passage of minimal civil 
31 rights legislation during the eight year period to 1960. 
For the Republican, the civil rights issue proved to 
be a particularly thorny one. The struggle over the adop¬ 
tion of an acceptable civil rights program proved to be the 
-^David (ed.) , ojo. cit., p. 33. 
^•*-White, 0£. cit., p. 156. 
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. 32 mam contest at Chicago. The original Republican plat¬ 
form contained what Barry Goldwater called a "moderate" view 
on civil rights. The party had neither expressed support of 
lunch counter "sit-ins" nor had it taken a definite stand on 
guaranteeing equal job opportunities for Negroes. 
As it was, the Republican platform plank on civil 
rights was accepted by the more conservative element of the 
party. In retrospect, it is believed by some conservatives 
in the party that in its original form the Republican's 
civil rights plank could have possibly won the 1960 elec¬ 
tion for the party, in that it would have enabled Nixon to 
carry the deep south. Nixon, however, was faced with the 
dilemma of placating two opposing views within the party on 
the issue of civil rights. The conservative element in the 
party advocated keeping the platform in its original form 
and possibly carrying the South, but alienating the northern 
Negro (who normally votes Democratic by overwhelming margins, 
and whose vote at that time was estimated to be critical in 
six of the eight most populous states). On the other hand, 
32 Karl A. Lamb, "Civil Rights and the Republican 
Platform: Nixon Achieves Control," Inside Politics: The Na¬ 
tional Conventions, 1960, ed. by Paul Tillet (New York: 
Oceana Publications, Inc., 1962), p. 83. 
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the liberal element in the party felt that Nixon should try 
to outbid the Democrats for the Northern Negro vote (which 
may have won the election for him) by matching their posi¬ 
tion on civil rights. This position alienated the conserva- 
. 33 tive Republican element. 
It was the liberal view that ultimately prevailed in 
the Republican camp.3^ Nixon's views had been largely in¬ 
fluenced by Governor Rockefeller and the possible threat of 
losing New York state in the election. Consequently, on 
July 22-23, he and Rockefeller conferred in New York City. 
Out of this meeting arose a 14-point statement of policy es- 
sentials closely paralleling Rockefeller's views. 
Campaign strategies 
The 1960 Presidential campaign is marked by five 
distinct phases, covering the period from the end of the 
party conventions to the eve of the November election. D 
33White, ojo. cit., pp. 233-234. 
-^As a result of the meeting between Nixon and New 
York Governor Nelson Rockefeller on July 23, 1960, the 
party's moderate position on civil rights was substituted by 
the more liberal view which Rockefeller had urged Nixon to 
adopt. See, Ibid.y also, Appendix B. 
35Ibid., pp. 232, 434-36. 
3^The following discussion is based largely upon, 
Stanley Kelley, Jr., ojo. cit., pp. 74-87. 
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The first phase, lasted from the end of the party conven¬ 
tions until the day before the scheduled summer session of 
Congress convened. The summer congressional session, last¬ 
ing from August 8 to September 1, was the second phase. On 
September 2, the formal campaign began. This third phase 
lasted until September 25, the day before the first televi¬ 
sion debate. The great debates themselves, lasting from 
September 26 to October 21 marked the fourth phase; and 
finally, the fifth phase, or homestretch, lasted from Octo¬ 
ber 22 to November 7. 
Campaign organization.—During this phase of organi¬ 
zation and planning, the candidates prepared the groundwork 
for their respective campaigns. This was also a time for 
settling old rivalries within the parties. 
This job of mending differences proved more diffi¬ 
cult for Kennedy than for Nixon. Rockefeller and Goldwater 
had already backed out of the campaign and pledged their 
support for Nixon's candidacy, although Goldwater later 
balked at the revised civil rights plank adopted at the 
convention. Kennedy, on the other hand, went into the con¬ 
vention with Johnson, Symington and Stevenson still in ton- 
tention for the nomination. Consequently, after his suc¬ 
cessful nomination, he had to make amends with his rivals 
81 
and try to unite them in support behind his candidacy. With 
Johnson, this was no problem; he had been brought into the 
Kennedy fold by the vice presidential nomination. Eventual¬ 
ly, Symington, Stevenson, and even former President Truman 
were brought into the Kennedy camp; and the candidate made 
a special trip to Hyde Park to get Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt 
to support his candidacy. 
The summer Congressional session.--The phase found 
three of the parties' four candidates trapped in a baring 
session of Congress--Nixon as Senate president, Johnson as 
majority leader, and Kennedy as junior Senator from Massa¬ 
chusetts . 
During the course of the summer session, Congress 
wrapped up its left-over spring business, indicating passage 
of a treaty on Anarctica and a foreign aid appropriations 
bill. Perhaps the most significant outcome of this session 
37 was the mangling of Kennedy's legislative proposals. Some 
37 Among the Kennedy legislative proposals defeated 
in the August, 1960, special session of Congress were those 
designed to: tie medical care for the aged to Social Secu¬ 
rity; provide a minimum wage of $1.25 an hour; provide fed¬ 
eral aid to education by making grants to the states and 
allowing them to determine whether the money should be used 
for teachers’ salaries or new schools. Despite the defeat 
of these measures by Congress, Kennedy again pledged him¬ 
self to them during the 1960 campaign. See, White, ojo. cit♦, 
p. 285; New York Times, November 13, 1960. 
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of them managed to squeak through the Senate, but none sur¬ 
vived the House. As if to add insult to injury, Kennedy 
was also disturbed by the fact that Nixon, uninformed by 
the need of daily attendance at Senate sessions, had already 
38 begun his campaign. 
The formal campaign: first part.—Congress adjourned 
on September 1, on the following day the 1960 presidential 
campaign formally began. During this phase both candidates 
barnstormed the entire country, speaking as many as twelve 
times a day. It is during this phase that Kennedy, addres¬ 
sing the Greater Houston, Texas, Ministerial Association, 
met head-on with the religious issue in the campaign. It 
is also during this phase, that Soviet Premier Kruschev 
visited the United Nations. Nixon saw an opportunity to 
put Kennedy at a disadvantage by suggesting that he not dis¬ 
cuss America's ills while the Soviet Premier was in the 
United States. Nixon's strategy failed, however, and Kennedy 
continued his "loss of prestige" theme. 
The great debates.—The series of four television 
debates dominated activity during the fourth phase of the 
campaign. In this unprecedential series of encounters, the 
38 White, op. cit., p. 285. 
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two candidates were on nationally televised programs during 
the course of which questions were posed by newsmen and the 
O Q 
two candidates were allowed to refute each others answers. 
Both sides claimed victory in the debates. Republi¬ 
cans blamed poor lighting for Nixon not being at his best 
during the first debate, but they held that he was better 
than Kennedy during the other three. The Democrats, on the 
other hand, claimed that their candidate was not as young, 
inexperienced and immature as Nixon had claimed. 
Perhaps the major accomplishment of the Great De¬ 
baters was that they furnished the American voter a candid 
view of two men under stress, and allowed them to decide 
which styles of performance under stress they would prefer 
. . 40 m their next president. 
Homestretch.—When the series of television debates 
ended on October 21, the candidates entered the campaign's 
homestretch. Kennedy continued his predictions of an eco¬ 
nomic recession, and to emphasize America's loss of prestige. 
The latter contention was supported by United States 
Congressional Quarterly Service, OJD. cit., pp. 32- 
33. 
40 . 
White, op. cit., p. 332. 
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Information Agency reports of America's declining prestige 
abroad that were leaked to the press during the latter part 
of the campaign. 
Nixon, on the other hand, began a stepped-up attack 
on his opponent, going to the extent of accusing him of 
41 
"barefaced lies." He also began to place greater emphasis 
on his association with the Eisenhower administration, and 
the importance of his role in the administration's decisions. 
In an effort to bring Kennedy's Catholicism to the forefront 
just before the election, an attempt was made to make Octo¬ 
ber 30, Reformation Sunday, a day to unite Protestants 
against Kennedy. 
In a last minute move, Kennedy attempted an all-out 
gamble to attract Negro support. During the last part of 
October, the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., had been ar¬ 
rested and jailed in Georgia for a traffic violation. While 
Kennedy telephoned Mrs. King to extend his sympathy, his 
brother, Robert, made inquiries into King's right to bail. 
Consequently, King's parents endorsed the candidate, and 
Kennedy forces took the initiative to make this fact widely 
42 known among Negroes. 
41Ibid., p. 343. 
42Ibid., p. 363. 
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Vice-President Nixon failed to make a statement con¬ 
cerning the incident, perhaps because he, like Kennedy, was 
gambling on the support of Negroes and southern whites, and 
felt that such a statement would be a detriment to him. The 
reason for his inaction, in this instance, may also be found 
in the contradictory statements his running mate Lodge had 
promised in Harlem that a Negro would be in the Nixon 
Cabinet; in Virginia, he said that he could make no such 
43 promise. 
The 1960 presidential campaign was for the most part 
a hectic and closely contested one. By election day, 1960, 
both candidates had travelled extensively. Kennedy had 
covered all of 75,000 miles, visiting 46 states in the pro¬ 
cess, while Nixon had visited all 50 states, but for a 
44 slightly smaller total of 65,000 miles. Both candidates 
had been widely exposed to the public, either being seen or 
heard in person, or through the media of radio and tele¬ 
vision. Moreover, for the first time in history the two 
major party presidential candidates had met face-to-face 
before a national television audience to debate the issues 
43Ibid., pp. 335-336. 
44Ibid., p. 356. 
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in the campaign. The 1960 campaign is also reported to have 
been the most expensive on record. 
Results of the 1960 Presidential election 
January 20, 1961, marked the end of the Eisenhower 
years. On that day, John F. Kennedy became 34th President 
of the United States. At 43 years of age, he became the 
youngest man ever elected to that office. The following 
discussion is an analysis of the structure of that vote 
which transformed Kennedy from Massachusetts' junior Senator 
into President of the United States by one of the slimmest 
margins of victory in this century. 
On November 8, 1960, 68,838,979 American voters— 
roughly 65 per cent of the 107 million eligible American 
voters--cast their ballots for their choice as the next 
President of the United States. This figure represented the 
greatest turnout of American voters in the history of the 
country. 
The 112,803-vote plurality by which Massachusetts 
Senator Kennedy emerged victorious from the contest, was 
the smallest presidential win-margin of the 20th century. 
By way of comparison, the narrowness of the candidate's win- 
margin is surpassed only by three national elections in the 
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100-year period immediately preceeding the 1960 election, 
all of which occurred during the eight-year period between 
1880 and 1888.45 
In the 1880 contest, between Winfield J. Hancock 
and James A. Garfield, the victorious candidate won a popu¬ 
lar vote plurality of only 9,464 votes. His electoral 
margin, however, was 214-155. In the 1884 election, Grover 
Cleveland defeated James G. Blaine by 23,005 votes, with an 
electoral split of 219-182. The third election illustrates 
one of the strange phenomena of American electoral politics. 
In that 1888 contest, the incumbent President, Cleveland, 
increased his popular vote plurality over the previous elec¬ 
tion by some 77,451 votes, but was defeated in the Electoral 
College by Benjamin Harrison who polled 233 votes to his 
-, ™ 46 168. 
The Presidential election of 1876 also demands con¬ 
sideration in this light. In one respect it is even closer 
than the 1960 election. Although the victorious candidate, 
Rutherford B. Hayes, had a 264,000-vote plurality, more than 





op. cit., pp. 48-56. 
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victory of 185-184 over the defeated Samuel J. Tilden. So 
close was this election that a shift of only 464 votes in 
the state of Florida would have given that state's four 
. 47 
electoral votes to Tilden and thereby the election. 
The final vote totals in the 1960 Presidential elec¬ 
tion shows that the victorious Kennedy-Johnson ticket polled 
34,221,349 votes from 23 states with a total of 303 elector¬ 
al votes. The Nixon-Lodge team carried 26 states with a 
48 total of 220 electoral votes. Their popular vote total 
was 34,108,546. As Table 9 illustrates, the two major can¬ 
didates received respectively, 49.7 and 49.5 per cent of the 
total vote cast. The remaining .08 per cent was divided 
among the thirteen other minor party candidates. It will 
also be noted here that Kennedy's electoral vote total gave 
him a more impressive margin of victory, capturing some 
62 per cent of the electoral vote as opposed to 36 per cent 
for Nixon. 
By some measures, the Nixon-Lodge team should have 
won the 1960 election. For instance, Nixon carried 26 of 
47Ibid., pp. 45-47. 
AQ 
A Republican elector in the State of Oklahoma cast 
his vote for Senator Harry F. Byrd, thereby raising his 
total electoral vote to 15, and lowering Nixon's to 219. 
TABLE 9 
NATIONWIDE VOTE IN 1960 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
Percentage Electoral 
Candidates Party Popular Vote Popular Vote Vote 
John F. Kennedy and 
Lyndon B. Johnson Democratic 34,221,349 49.70 303 
( 62%) 
Richard M. Nixon and 
Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. Republican 34,108,546 49.50 219 
(36%) 
Harry F. Byrd Independent 404,298 .60 15 
( 2%) 
Unpledged Electors States 1 Rights 
(Louisiana) Democrats 169,572 .20 
Eric Hass and 
George Cozzini Socialist Labor 47,522 .00 
Rutherford L. Decker and 
E. Harold Munn Prohibition 46,220 .00 
Orval E. Faubus and National States 1 
John G. Grommelin Rights 44,967 .00 
Farrell Dobbs and 
Myra T. Weiss Socialist Workers 40,175 .00 
TABLE 9—Continued 





Charles L. Sullivan and 
Merritt B. Curtis Constitutional 18,169 .00 
Joseph B. Lee and 
Kent H. Courtney Conservative 8, 708 .00 
C. Benton Coiner and 
Edward J. Silverman 
Virginia Conserva¬ 
tive 4, 204 .00 
Lar Daly and 
B. M. Miller Tax Cut 1, 767 .00 
Clennon King and 
Reginald Carter 
Independent Afro- 
American 1,485 .00 
Merritt B. Curtis and 
B. M. Miller Constitution 1,401 .00 
Independent American 
Party 539 .00 




the nation's states as compared to only 23 for Kennedy. The 
remaining state, Mississippi, elected a slate of unpledged 
electors; but the Democrats did manage to capture a majority 
of the state's two-party vote. 
When the country is divided into its eight major 
geographical areas, it can be seen that Nixon carried five 
49 of these as compared to Kennedy's three. This does not 
necessarily mean that Nixon polled a majority of the votes 
in all of the states in these areas. It does mean, however, 
that his combined total of votes for the entire geographical 
area surpassed that of Kennedy. The same thing applies to 
Kennedy in the geographical areas that he carried. 
Of the five geographical areas carried by Nixon, the 
five traditionally Republican farm states returned his 
greatest margin of victory. Here Nixon won by a margin of 
some 598,000 votes. The eight-state Rocky Mountain area 
registered the next greatest amount of support for the Re¬ 
publican ticket. Here, Nixon out-polled his Democratic op¬ 
ponent by 192,313 votes. In the traditionally Democratic 
and highly-Protestant five-state area bordering on the Old 
49 The following discussion is taken from White, 
op. cit., pp. 393-395. 
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South, Mr. Nixon led by a margin of 263,033 votes. In the 
six Midwestern states, widely acknowledged as the Republican 
Party's greatest single base of support, Mr. Nixon won by a 
462,778 vote plurality. Finally, Mr. Nixon did worse by far 
in the five Pacific Coast states. Here, in the candidate's 
home area, he only polled some 107,000 votes more than his 
opponent. 
In the three geographical areas carried by Kennedy, 
his home area of New England gave him his greatest margin of 
victory—603,587 votes more than his opponent. When com¬ 
pared with the total votes cast, Kennedy's victory margin 
here is only slightly less impressive than Nixon's in the 
farm state area. Ten states in the traditionally Democratic 
Deep South ranked next in their support of the Democratic 
candidate. Here, Kennedy polled better than 530,000 votes 
more than Nixon. Finally, the five Middle Atlantic states, 
three of which have a combined electoral total of 93 votes, 
gave Kennedy a 601,570 vote lead over Nixon. 
Aside from these facts, the tide of the 1960 elec¬ 
tion could easily have been turned on any one or combination 
of, a significant number of "ifs." For instance, if Presi¬ 
dent Eisenhower had been used earlier, and more extensively 
throughout the Nixon campaign, or if he had been used in 
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certain areas as opposed to others, the outcome of the elec¬ 
tion might possibly have been changed. On the other hand, 
if Nixon had definitely decided whether he wanted the north¬ 
ern Negro vote or the southern white vote, perhaps he would 
not have been prone to make the contradictory statements he 
did while campaigning in Harlem and Virginia regarding the 
appointment of a Negro to his cabinet upon election. Such 
a statement apparently cast doubts on both sides. Also, if 
Mixon had moved in a straight-forward manner, as did the 
Kennedys, in the arrest in Georgia of civil rights leader, 
Martin Luther King, Jr., he may have captured a greater 
50 share of the Negro vote. 
Considering the closeness of the election, and the 
possible avenues by which Nixon may have been victorious, 
its outcome can be attributed to but one thing—better plan¬ 
ning and organization on the part of Kennedy forces. De¬ 
spite the narrowness of his victory margin, the Kennedy 
strategy afforded him the right amount of votes in the right 
51 
places to turn the election tide in his favor. 
In a statement made during the early part of the 
50 
Ibid., pp. 350, 395. 
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summer, 1960, Negro Representative Adam Clayton Powell of 
New York said that Senator Kennedy "could not carry the 
Negro vote" in the November election. Moreover, for a New 
52 
Englander, "he had a 'had civil-rights record.'" This 
statement is indicative of Negro sentiment for Kennedy at 
that time; and as he entered the National Convention at Los 
Angeles he was by far the least popular among Negroes of 
all the Democratic hopefuls, including—in some circles— 
Southerner, Lyndon B. Johnson. 
Nevertheless, determination, hard work, and clever 
strategy on the part of the Kennedy organization combined to 
change this attitude among Negroes for the candidate. Even 
Representative Powell, after "much negotiation," had changed 
53 his opinion of the candidate by mid-September. The cli¬ 
max of this reversal in Negro opinion toward the candidate 
was perhaps reached with Kennedy's "eleventh-hour" phone 
call to Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr. concerning the arrest 
of her husband. This move apparently effected a great 
change in Negro attitude toward Kennedy, and is considered 
52 James Q. Wilson, "How Will the Negro Vote?," The 
Reporter, XXIII (October 13, 1960), 36. 
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one of the single most important factors in turning that 
54 vote in his favor. 
The Kennedy strategy in trying to win Negro support 
was obviously effective. In the November election, Negroes 
voted overwhelmingly in his favor. Richard Scammon cites 
instances of northern Negro voting, wherein Kennedy out- 
polled his opponent by four and even five-to-one margins in 
certain predominantly Negro areas. The same is true, but to 
55 a greater extent, for the South and border state areas. 
Before turning now to a discussion of one particular 
instance of Negro voting in the South in 1960, namely, 
Atlanta, Georgia, it would be well to undertake a discussion 
of the state-wide election results in Georgia. A point worth 
noting here is that the state of Georgia has the best Demo¬ 
cratic voting record in the United States. In the 24 presi¬ 
dential elections between 1868 and 1960, Georgia voted 
Democratic in each, including the 1948 election wherein the 
States' Rights Party furnished ample opportunity for dis¬ 
satisfied Democrats to desert the Party. No other state, 
54 White, op. cit., pp. 363-364. 
C C 
Richard M. Scammon, "How the Negroes Voted," The 
New Republic, CXLIII (November 21, 1960), 9. 
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North or South, can match this record of support for the 
Democratic Party. 
In 1960, Georgia was once again high on the list of 
Democratic support. Only two other states, Massachusetts 
and New York, gave the Democratic candidate a greater margin 
of victory over the Republican candidate. Neither state, 
however, gave the Democratic candidate a greater percentage 
of its vote than Georgia. The two states combined, each 
registering a larger total of popular votes than Georgia, 
gave the Democratic candidate an average of 56.4 per cent 
of their vote, whereas, Georgia gave Senator Kennedy 62.5 
. 56 per cent of its vote. 
Again, in keeping with the national trend, the turn¬ 
out among Georgia voters was slightly higher in 1960 than 
in either of the three preceeding elections. 
Generally, the margins of victory in the 148 coun¬ 
ties carried by the Democrats in 1960 were substantial ones, 
reaching, percentage-wise, as high as the low 90's in three 
of Georgia's counties—Baker, Franklin, and Madison. In 
the remaining eleven counties not in the Democratic column 
^Ben W. Fortson, Secretary of State, Official 
State of Georgia Tabulation by Counties for Presidential, 
General Election, November 8, 1960. 
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in I960, the Republican percentage reached a high of only 
57 
76.4 in but one county—Long. 
Election returns from Fulton County reflect the 
closeness of the election on the national level. Although 
the Democrats polled a majority of the votes in the county, 
Fulton voters did not manifest as much support for the 
Party as they had eight, or even four years earlier. 
At the time of the 1960 Presidential election, there 
were roughly 34,400 Negroes registered to vote in the City 
of Atlanta. A total of 25,266 of these registered Negro 
voters were located in twelve predominantly Negro precincts, 
which are usually referred to as significant indicators of 
Negro sentiment in any major election. 
The results of the 1960 election in Atlanta were 
rather surprising. Instead of voting overwhelmingly Demo¬ 
cratic as did most other Negro areas in the country—and as 
C Q 
many local political observers had predicted—the twelve 
predominantly Negro precincts in Atlanta gave Vice-President 
Nixon a 2,847-vote plurality over Senator Kennedy. Table 10 
contains a breakdown of the Kennedy-Nixon vote in the 
57 Ibid. 
58 Atlanta Journal. November 9, 1960. 
TABLE 10 





Votes Cast for 
Kennedy 
Votes Cast for 
Nixon 
Total 
Per Cent Number Per Cent Number Per Cent 
1-C 1,398 651 46.57 747 53.43 100.00 
3-A 389 159 40.87 230 59.13 100.00 
3-B 2,060 788 38.25 1,272 61.75 100.00 
3-E 2,414 1,038 43.90 1,376 56.10 100.00 
3-H 1,849 752 40.67 1,097 59.33 100.00 
3-K 1,103 423 38.35 680 61.65 100.00 
3-N 631 313 49.61 318 50.39 100.00 
4-1 1,681 680 40.45 1,001 59.55 100.00 
6-H 1, 692 746 44.09 946 55.91 100.00 
6-1 1,649 788 47.79 861 52.21 100.00 
7-A 2,093 910 43.48 1,183 56.52 100.00 
Q
 l 
r* 1,838 677 36.83 1,161 63.17 100.00
Totals 18,797 7,925 42.16 10,872 5 7.84 100.00 
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predominantly Negro precincts. 
So as not to mislead, the figures in Table 10 should 
be interpreted with caution. Superficial analysis of the 
data might lead one to believe that Negroes in Atlanta voted 
decidedly against the Democrats in that election. This as¬ 
sumption, however, is not wholly valid; it does not imply 
the extent to which Negroes shifted their party support over 
the eight-year period between 1952 and 1960. In order to 
get a truer understanding of the 1960 results, these figures 
must be interpreted in light of the results of the two pre- 
ceeding Presidential elections. 
When the data in Table 10 are compared with those in 
Tables 6 (1952) and 8 (1956), quite a different picture of 
the 1960 election is gotten. For instance, it can be 
readily seen that Negroes in Atlanta voted Democratic in 
1952, then took a major turn away from that Party and voted 
decisively in favor of the Republican Party in 1956. The 
Republicans' victory margin was cut tremendously in 1960, 
however. Nevertheless, the Party did manage to poll some 
15 per cent more of the Negro vote than did the Democrats. 
By comparing Tables 8 and 10, it can be seen that in 
1960 the Democrats ran some 23 per cent better in Negro pre¬ 
cincts than in 1956. On the other hand, the Republicans, in 
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1960, whose candidate in 1956 outpolled his opponent better 
than four-to-one in Negro precincts, rank behind their 1956 
vote total by the same margin. 
Finally, a comparison of Tables 6 and 10 shows that 
in 1960, the Democratic candidate ran 13.87 per cent behind 
the Party's 1952 standard-bearer, while the Republican can¬ 
didate in 1960 realized a similar increase over his Party's 
1952 candidate. 
A final consideration of the three elections between 
1952 and 1960 is in order and will perhaps shed more light 
on the 1960 results. During this eight-year period, both 
major parties suffered losses—and gains at the other's ex¬ 
pense—in Negro support in Atlanta. The Democrats, however, 
lost more of the Negro support in Atlanta between the years 
1952 and 1956 (37.54 per cent) than did the Republicans be¬ 
tween 1956 and 1960 (23.67 per cent). In 1960, the Repub¬ 
lican candidate still out-polled the Democratic candidate 
in the Negro precincts, but the Democratic candidate made 
substantial inroads into gaining back that Negro support 
the Party lost in 1956. In the 1960 election, the Democratic 
candidate picked up the 23 per cent of the Negro vote that 
the Republicans had lost between 1956 and 1960. However, 
the candidate was still 13.87 per cent short of gaining back 
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all of his Party's original loss in Negro support. 
It is interesting to note here that a shift of only 
932 votes would have changed the outcome of the 1960 elec¬ 
tion in Fulton County. This change could have been effected 
easily in one of the predominantly Negro precincts alone— 
precinct 3-E, which cast a total of 1,038 votes for the vic¬ 
torious Kennedy. Had such a shift in the votes taken place- 
roughly .12 per cent of Kennedy's total in the Negro pre¬ 
cincts—Nixon would have had a plurality in Fulton County 
in the barest sense. 
Based on the above supposition, it seems safe to con 
elude that, although Atlanta Negroes did not give Kennedy a 
majority of their vote in 1960, they, nevertheless, provided 
the necessary margin by which Kennedy carried Fulton County 
in 1960. 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Since the adoption of the United States Constitu¬ 
tion there have been restrictions imposed on the suffrage— 
either in the form of religious and property qualifications, 
sex, or race. Over the years, however, these restrictions 
were dropped one-by-one, and the suffrage was broadened, 
gradually being extended to more than the privileged class 
of adult white males. 
The last of these bars to fall—and by far the most 
difficult change to effect—were the restrictions on race. 
Before these restrictions were dropped, however, the Negro 
had to endure a long and arduous struggle, beginning with 
the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870, and climax¬ 
ing some 75 years later with the Supreme Court's landmark 
decision in 1944. 
The passage of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend¬ 
ments had a profound effect on the southern states. The im¬ 
mediate reaction of white southerners was to write into 
state constitutions provisions designed to disfranchise 
Negroes, but at the same time remaining within the limits 
102 
103 
of both Constitutional Amendments. 
The states of Mississippi, South Carolina, and 
Louisiana led the way in devising constitutional schemes to 
disfranchise Negroes. Constructed so as to give the impres¬ 
sion of applying to whites as well as Negroes, these pro¬ 
visions served as examples for other states to follow. 
A classic example of this method of disfranchisement 
was found in the Louisiana constitution of 1898. That 
state's now-famous grandfather clause was amended into the 
Oklahoma constitution of 1910, and served as the basis of 
the first major twentieth century test of constitutional dis¬ 
franchisement. This case, which came before the Court in 
1915, also provided the avenue by which the NAACP first be¬ 
came actively involved in the long struggle for Negro rights. 
(Between the time of this case in 1915, and the ultimate 
fall of the white primary, the NAACP was to present twenty- 
two cases to the Supreme Court, winning twenty, losing one, 
and having one decision pending at the time of the Smith 
case.) 
The case that obviously furnished the basis for one 
of the most serious obstacles to Negro suffrage in the 
United States was the 1920 Newberry case, wherein the Court 
apparently sanctioned the idea of a white primary. Working 
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on the implications of this case, the State of Texas in 1923 
legislated to exclude Negroes from Democratic primaries in 
the state. This marked the first time that any state had 
taken direct action to openly disfranchise Negroes on the 
basis of race alone. The constitutionality of such a flag¬ 
rant effort was thus open to challenge. 
The series of white primary decisions that followed 
is now history. The NAACP played an active role in each, 
suffering but one defeat, the 1935 Grovey decision. The 
long-awaited moment of triumph, however, was reached in 
April, 1945, when the NAACP won a "smashing victory" before 
the Supreme Court, thus, effectively putting an end to the 
method by which Negroes had been legally barred from partic¬ 
ipation in the Democratic primaries. 
a corrolary case to the Smith decision was the Primus 
King case in Georgia. The invalidation of the white primary 
and the war stimulus had produced a general resurgence of 
political activity among Negroes in the South. Nevertheless, 
Georgia's Negroes were still prohibited from participation 
in the state's Democratic primaries because the State Execu¬ 
tive Committee refused to abide by the Smith Decision for 
the reason that Georgia officials were not parties to the 
case. The Federal District Court, however, overruled this 
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contention, and the Supreme Court sustained the action by 
refusing to review the case. 
The action of the courts in the King case finally 
removed one of the long-standing bars to Negro participation 
in Georgia politics. It was not until some time later that 
Georgia's 3-2-1 County Unit Plan, which neutralized the ef¬ 
fect of Negro voting, was finally discontinued. In the mean¬ 
time, Negro voter registration in Georgia began to increase. 
The total Negro registration in Georgia shortly after the 
King Decision was about 125,000 more than any other southern 
state at that time. Five years later, that figure had in¬ 
creased by about 20,000 voters, surpassed only by the state 
of Texas. From that time on increases in Negro voter regis¬ 
tration was gradual. Increases in Atlanta's Negro registra¬ 
tion were rather substantial immediately following the King 
Decision, but later the rate of increase assumed a more 
gradual pace. To say that these Negroes were Democrats, as 
were the majority of those registered in other parts of the 
country, seems a needless repetition. 
It is a widely known fact that Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and his New Deal policies were instrumental in causing 
Negroes to bolt the Party that had granted them the right to 
vote and form a seemingly impregnable alliance with the 
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Democratic Party, even agreeing to the selection of several 
southerners as Vice Presidential candidates. Even 
Roosevelt's failure to end racial discrimination in the 
armed forces failed to daunt the spirits of Negroes in the 
support of the Democratic Party. This same tendency was 
evident throughout his successor's seven-year tenute in 
office. Any hope of reestablishing the old Republican-Negro 
alliance at this time seemed desparingly lost. 
In 1952, however, when the Eisenhower Era finally 
brought an end to the New Deal and Fair Deal years, the 
Negroes' support of the Democratic ticket on the national 
level began a marked decline; Negroes reached a high point 
in defection in 1956. From 1936 to 1952, Negroes had given 
» 
Democratic Presidential candidates better than 70 per cent 
of their votes. Then in 1956 the Democratic candidate ran 
far behind the Party's previous national average and also 
behind his 1952 average in Negro districts. In Atlanta, the 
trend was virtually the same. The Democratic candidate in 
1956 ran some 37 percentage points behind his 1952 total in 
Atlanta. The 1960 Democratic candidate, however, apparently 
made up for this deficit in Negro support by gaining more 
than 23 per cent of that Negro vote in Atlanta that was lost 
between the first and second Stevenson attempts at the 
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Presidency. 
One fact is obvious from the 1960 election results: 
that is, that the Negro vote was instrumental in the elec¬ 
tion of Senator John F. Kennedy. The Negro vote, however, 
can not be rightfully said to have been the deciding element 
in the outcome of the election; for Kennedy strategists put 
together a coalition of Negroes, Jews, Catholics and non- 
Catholics, labor, and southerners that defeated Vice-Presi¬ 
dent Richard M. Nixon. Had any one of these groups gone 
the other way, Kennedy would have been defeated. Had any 
one not supported his candidacy to the extent that they did, 
the election tide would have been turned. 
The obvious reversal of Negro voting trends in this 
election is the one factor—aside from the closeness of the 
election itself—that has created considerable debate. It 
is an established fact that in many areas carried by the De¬ 
mocrats in 1960 the Negro vote was great enough to provide 
the margin by which Kennedy won. For instance, in three 
northern states, New Jersey, Illinois, and Michigan, which 
gave Kennedy slightly better than a 100,000-vote plurality 
over Nixon, the Negro vote in those states exceeded 700,000. 
In New Jersey alone it was roughly 125,000. The same thing 
is true of the South. Missouri, for example, with some 
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100,000 Negro votes cast in 1960, gave Kennedy a 35,000-vote 
plurality. The statistical evidence in these cases, how¬ 
ever, is not as important as a much more encompassing ques¬ 
tion; that is, why did the Negroes, who had voted so 
strongly Republican in 1956, make a turn away from that 
Party in 1960 and support the Democratic Presidential candi¬ 
date? 
It is felt that a major reason for this shift in 
the Negro vote in 1960 was the failure of the Republican 
Party to be more productive in the area of civil rights. 
Although the Republicans in their 1956 platform took a more 
positive stand on the issue than did the Democrats, the 
fact remained that both parties had still adopted somewhat 
weakened planks on civil rights. And as the Eisenhower 
years progressed, the exact position of the Republican Party 
on civil rights became more uncertain. Another factor aid¬ 
ing Kennedy's cause among Negroes was that by October, 1960, 
unemployment in the nation had increased by about 200,000. 
October is generally considered a month wherein the unemploy¬ 
ment rate drops by about that margin. To Negroes, who are 
generally the last in line for jobs, this was of vital im¬ 
portance . 
Another possible explanation of Kennedy's appeal to 
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Negroes may well have been found in the image he portrayed. 
As one writer has said, Kennedy's image was that of a new 
59 
Roosevelt. Roosevelt had been the one great white man of 
the century, and perhaps Kennedy appeared to be a second, 
capable of making accomplishments in the area of civil rights 
as well as being able to effect some change in the nation's 
lagging economy. 
Perhaps the most important single factor in changing 
the course of the Negro vote in Atlanta was Kennedy's inter¬ 
vention in the late October arrest and imprisonment of civil 
rights leader, Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. Although 
Reverend King had refused to show any political preference 
during the Presidential campaign, it was a widely held be¬ 
lief that if he were to take a stand on one of the candi¬ 
dates, it would probably have been in favor of Vice-Presi¬ 
dent Nixon. His arrest, however, afforded both candidates 
the opportunity to prove their sympathy with the Negro 
cause. Kennedy did just that. Upon learning of the arrest, 
candidate Kennedy immediately phoned Mrs. King, expressing 
his condolence, while his brother, Robert, inquired into 
Reverend King's right to bail. Nixon, on the other hand, 
59 Scammon, loc. cit. 
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hesitated to make a move in this situation, perhaps fearing 
the possibility of alienating the southern white vote. 
Prior to the 1960 Presidential election, the general 
consensus among local political observers seemed to be that 
the Negro vote would go to the Republican candidate, Nixon. 
It is felt, however, that the King arrest, and the related 
events, is one (repeat, one) of the major factors in causing 
the marked shift in the Negro vote in 1960. 
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